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Since the Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. case in
1911,1 the Supreme Court has viewed the Sherman Act as a congres-
sional mandate to regulate the ways manufacturers may distribute their
products. These vertical restraint cases have a simple, recurring plot. A
terminated dealer or wholesaler, often a price cutter, complains that its
manufacturer is in league with rival dealers or wholesalers who want to
restrain competition in the product. In typical cases, the underlying re-
straint alleged is a resale price maintenance agreement or a clause confin-
ing dealer activities to a limited geographic area. The question in such
cases is whether the Court should permit the manufacturer to terminate
the complaining dealer or wholesaler.
The Court has sought to answer the question of wrongful termina-
tion by turning to section 2 of the Sherman Act and its requirement of an
agreement in restraint of trade. The orthodox view of this doctrine is
that the Court was, or should have been, concerned with the anticompe-
titive effects of the manufacturer's conduct. The modern view is that the
Court is, or should be, concerned with the effects on distributional effi-
ciencies, which are characterized as a proxy for competitive effects.
Neither view, however, brings any consistency or continuity to post-1911
vertical restraints doctrine. Rather, both approaches, proceeding from
the assumption that competition policy represents the only legitimate
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I would like to thank friends and col-
leagues who gave helpful comments on earlier drafts, especially David Gray Carlson, John
Flynn, Duncan Kennedy, and G. Edward White. Speeches based on versions of this Article
were presented to the Conference on Systems Science and Jurisprudence at Harvard Law
School on June 26, 1987, and to the Critical Legal Studies Conference at American University,
Washington College of Law on October 1, 1988. Some research for this Article was funded by
a New York Law School Faculty Research Grant. This is the second in a series of articles on
modem antitrust law, the historical and theoretical foundation for which was laid in Peritz,
The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 285 (1989).
1. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
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normative basis for antitrust law, have yielded readings of the Court's
vertical restraints opinions whose logic is a tangle of knotted doctrines in
desultory movement between a per se rule and a rule of reason standard.
One of the most insightful critics of current doctrine and scholarship can
only remark on the doctrine's haphazard course: "Over the years, Con-
gress and the courts have vacillated between disapproval and approval,
never reaching a resolution of the issue satisfactory to their successors."
'2
This Article applies a new analytical framework to untangle the
controversial and confusing web of doctrines that both the orthodox and
modem approaches have characterized as propelling the Court through
an enigmatic history of regulating vertical restraints. This new frame-
work questions the current view that antitrust law has always been
founded solely in a competition paradigm, whether the traditional mix of
Jeffersonian, redistributional, and fair play policies, or the efficiency for-
mulations currently in fashion.3 In contrast, my recent study of anti-
trust's early years chronicles a persistent and unyielding series of
confrontations between two paradigms-competition policy and com-
mon-law property rights.4 While both paradigms exhibit some changes
over time, they have remained central to vertical restraints doctrine since
1911. Indeed, ongoing tensions between them have constituted the very
conditions for producing vertical restraints doctrine. Adopting this new
framework of tensions between competition policy and common-law
property rights, this study offers an analysis that clarifies the structure
and dynamics of the Court's attempts to regulate manufacturers' distri-
2. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust
Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 983 (1985) (refuting Robert Bork's economic analysis approv-
ing vertical restraints).
3. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopoliza-
tion of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1280 [hereinafter Peritz, Predic-
ament]. The new framework supplements the competition paradigm in two ways. First, it
portrays the production of early antitrust law as a series of confrontations between competition
policy and common-law property rights. Thus, ongoing tensions between the two para-
digms--competition and property-are seen as the historical production factors for antitrust
in the formative years. Second, the new framework shows these paradigms to be riven by an
internal tension as well. Each paradigm, as it functioned in antitrust's formative period, re-
flected impulses to both liberty and equality. -Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust Law:
Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 336-41 (1989) [hereinafter
Peritz, Rule of Reason].
In this article, the terms "paradigm," "logic," "rhetorical mode," and "rhetoric" are
treated as synonymous, each identifying a group of assumptions and beliefs, as well as a system
of logical relations among the assumptions and beliefs.
4. Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3. This new analytical framework was developed
in the historical context of antitrust's formative years, by giving an alternative account of the
Sherman Act's legislative history and early cases through the emergence of the "rule of rea-
son" in 1911.
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bution of their products. This clarification provides the ground for a fun-
damental critique of the Court's current "free rider" analysis. This
Article concludes with a simple alternative to the "free rider" analysis.
The fundamental question for vertical restraints doctrine is how to
settle the controversies arising out of the complex web of relationships
among producers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers. Consider two
modes of characterizing the issue. The familiar rhetorical mode, that of
competition, invites us to see the issue in terms of intrabrand competi-
tion. In other words, the proper inquiry should be the importance of
rivalry between dealers in the same manufacturer's product. Employing
this rhetorical mode, one could argue that intrabrand competition is
good for consumers, because it tends to lower retail prices. Alterna-
tively, one could assert that a manufacturer's restraint of intrabrand
competition is good for consumers, because a manufacturer would only
restrain competition in its own product to compete more effectively with
another manufacturer's product. Otherwise, the manufacturer would en-
courage competition between its dealers to minimize its distribution
costs, lowering price to the consumer and increasing demand for its
product. Though these two views of the producer-consumer relationship
seem to conflict, they both deploy the rhetorical mode of competition.
In contrast, a rhetorical mode of property invites us to see the verti-
cal restraints doctrine issue in terms of the legal relationship between the
producer and its product. Employing this mode, one could argue that a
manufacturer should have the right to control the distribution and sale of
its product, just as anyone else has the right to dispose of her property.
Alternatively, one could assert that once a producer passes title to a re-
tailer, control should also pass to the retailer, because the product has
become the retailer's property. Finally, the argument could be made that
a manufacturer's dependence on dealer good will should allow termina-
tion of price cutters in order to protect a fair return to dealers who pro-
mote its product. Though these three views of the legal relations between
producer and product differ, they all employ a rhetorical mode of
property.
The Supreme Court has developed four overlapping doctrines under
the Sherman Act to resolve the controversies arising out of complex dis-
tributional networks. 5 First, the so-called Colgate doctrine6 sanctions a
5. This Article is limited to conduct analyzed exclusively under the Sherman Act, in
order to keep the scope of this study manageable. Thus, I do not include, for example, either
the legislative histories of or the doctrine developed under the Clayton Act § 3 offenses of tying
and exclusive dealing.
6. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
manufacturer's unilateral termination of an uncooperative dealer. Given
the fundamental right to dispose of one's property, the Court has fash-
ioned a doctrine consistent with the notion that contracting is voluntary.
Because it is not required to sell its goods to anyone, a manufacturer has
the right to terminate a dealer.7 If, however, a terminated dealer proves
that the manufacturer and other dealers agreed to restrain trade (by fix-
ing resale prices, for example), then the dealer is given an opportunity to
prove that its refusal to cooperate in an unlawful agreement motivated
the termination.
The second doctrine developed by the Court provides that even
when the terminated dealer proves an agreement restraining competition,
the Court still must determine whether the restraint is unlawful. The
standard of unlawfulness depends upon a distinction between price and
nonprice restraints. This doctrine calls for a per se rule for price re-
straints and a rule of reason standard for nonprice restraints such as ter-
ritorial or customer limitations. This unyielding view of resale price
maintenance-that there is no justification for displacing the market
pricing mechanism-resembles the competition logic of the literalist
opinions in the horizontal cartel cases. 8
Under a third doctrine, the Court from time to time has given spe-
cial treatment to agreements in restraint of competition that are ancillary
to consignment or agency contracts, rather than to straight sales agree-
ments. In 1977, however, Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.9
dissolved the distinction between consignment and sale, asserting that the
two forms of agreement had the same competitive effects. In that opin-
ion, the Court abandoned the common-law rationale, adopted in virtu-
ally every Supreme Court opinion since 1911, that a restraint ancillary to
a consignment is justified by the manufacturer's retention of title to con-
signed goods. This entitlement had sanctioned extensive control of the
product's distribution and sale, including some setting of resale prices.
The fourth and most recently adopted doctrine is the manufac-
turer's "free rider" rationale.' 0 Currently, this rationale can justify a
manufacturer's termination of any dealer, including a price cutter, so
long as there is no resale price maintenance agreement. When, for exam-
ple, the manufacturer and dealers have agreed to restrain competition by
7. Id. In practice, however, the producer has been given varying degrees of freedom in
terminating a dealer.
8. They held to the broader belief that only "full and free competition" can produce fair
prices. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 314-24.
9. 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977).
10. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
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limiting each dealer to an exclusive territory, the manufacturer may be
permitted to terminate a dealer who nonetheless competes outside its des-
ignated territory. The Court has sanctioned such conduct as a plausible
way of promoting interbrand competition. By protecting "fair profits" of
dealers who engage in promotional activities, the manufacturer is encour-
aging them to exert the best efforts necessary to compete effectively with
rival products.
Antitrust analysis based on competition logic simply has not made
sense of these threads of vertical restraint doctrine. In order to under-
stand the workings of each of these four doctrines, and the common
structure that they all share, we must supplement the orthodox paradigm
of competition. For example, traditional antitrust analysis has misunder-
stood the property logics underlying the common-law distinction be-
tween consignment and sale, representing it as a seventeenth century
anachronism, rather than an instance of common-law property rights,
which have been a fundamental component of antitrust law since the leg-
islative debates. Moreover, the same sort of property logic can be seen as
motivating the modem "free rider" rhetoric, an interest akin to protect-
ing property from theft. Thus, this Article seeks to contribute to a better
understanding of modem vertical restraints doctrines by analyzing them
within the framework of competition policy and common-law property
rights in productive conflict.
This genealogy of vertical restraints doctrine is organized using the
familiar distinction between price and nonprice restraints. Section I
takes the political economy of logics in tension as the framework for
making sense of the Supreme Court's landmark opinions dealing with
price restraints. In the course of this chronological treatment of cases,
concluding with the recently published Business Electronics Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp., " this section also analyzes the other vertical re-
straints doctrines as they appear in those cases. Section II takes up the
Court's establishment and development of a separate category for non-
price restraints, as well as the other doctrines appearing in those cases.
In sum, this study describes (1) how the continuous battle between com-
petition and property logics has produced the Court's frequent vacilla-
tion between the rule of reason standard and the per se rule, as well as its
nomadic movements within the quartet of vertical restraints doctrines;
(2) how the expansion of the rule of reason standard evidences the over-
whelming, though unacknowledged, strength of property logic in anti-
trust analysis of vertical restraints; (3) how a commitment to proliferate
11. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
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independent entrepreneurs derived from the individual liberty to dispose
of goods as one chooses; and (4) how, until recently, the "free rider"
rationale has mediated the tension between the logics of competition pol-
icy and individual property rights.
I. Resale Price Maintenance: The Legacy of Literalism
Transformed
The legacy of the Court's early "literalist" period is a vision of soci-
ety based on an unmitigated commitment to competition policy. The
literalists saw the antitrust laws as resting upon a policy of competition
free of all contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade.
They took that policy to mean free and unrestricted rivalry between nu-
merous market participants of roughly equal size-something like the
modern notion of workable competition. They were not persuaded by
arguments that some restraints of competition could be reasonable and
thus inoffensive to the Sherman Act. 12 In contrast, the "rule of reason"
faction objected to this unrelenting imposition of competition policy
when it limited freedom of contract, thereby injuring common-law prop-
erty rights. 13 To the extent that resale price maintenance agreements
have been adjudged illegal per se, that is, illegal without regard to their
reasonableness, vertical price restraints doctrine can be understood as a
legacy of the early literalists' unmitigated commitment to competition
between numerous market participants of roughly equal size.
A. Common-Law Property Rights and Competition Policy
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 14 offers a complex
example of strategies to interpose common-law doctrines to mediate ten-
12. See Peritz, supra note 3, at 314-24.
13. See id. at 324-36.
14. 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911); see, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 335
(1987) (citing Dr. Miles with approval). But see Baxter, Vertical Restraints and Resale Price
Maintenance: A Rule of Reason Approach, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 13, 26 (1982) (in
invalidating resale price maintenance in Dr. Miles, court relied on a proposition recognized in
recent cases to have little relevance to antitrust analysis); Bork, The Place ofAntitrust Among
National Goals, in BASIC ANTITRUST QUESTIONS IN THE MIDDLE SIXTIES: FIFTH CONFER-
ENCE ON THE IMPACT OF ANTITRUST ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 32 (Nat'l Indus. Conf. Bd.
1966) (the law of resale price maintenance and vertical market division has been rendered
mischievous and arbitrary to this day by the premise laid down in Dr. Miles); Posner, The Next
Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
6, 8 (1981) (proposing that "purely vertical restrictions or distribution be declared legal per
se"). Moreover, until their repeal in 1975, the so-called fair trade laws, which allowed state-
sanctioned resale price maintenance, certainly evidenced congressional disapproval of Dr.
Miles.
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sions between competition and property logics. For the past seventy-
eight years, Dr. Miles has stood for the proposition that resale price
maintenance is illegal per se under the Sherman Act, despite legislative,
judicial, and scholarly misgivings about its wisdom. The Court's opinion
in the case says very little about the anticompetitive effects of such con-
duct and even less about the Sherman Act. What little it does say about
competition involves intrabrand rivalry, a policy concern that is out of
favor today. The published argument of counsel, as well as both opin-
ions-Justice Hughes' majority opinion and Justice Holmes' lone dis-
sent-address at great length a series of issues concerning the extent of
Dr. Miles Medical Company's property rights in its patent medicine.
Only after Justice Hughes decided that Dr. Miles retained no common-
law property rights in the product sold to John D. Park & Sons did com-
petition rhetoric enter the majority opinion. Justice Holmes argued that
Dr. Miles Medical Company held both property and liberty rights that
legitimated its dealer agreements fixing the resale prices of its patent
medicine.
Unlike the typical dealer termination cases that followed, this suit
was brought by the manufacturer, Dr. Miles, to enjoin a discount retailer
from "maliciously interfer[ing] with a contract" to fix the resale prices of
its wholesalers and retailers. 15 Dr. Miles Medical Company alleged that
"cut rate and department stores," such as John D. Park & Sons, neither
promoted nor adequately stocked its product. Rather, they used it as a
loss leader. Thus, Dr. Miles wanted to limit its trade sales to small deal-
ers, because they were willing to promote the product in exchange for the
promise of a "fair profit."' 16 In this regard, Dr. Miles was careful to point
out that all dealers were treated equally.'
7
Dr. Miles' charge suggested that John D. Park & Sons' use of the
patent medicine as a loss leader was a competitive tort. That is, it "ad-
vertised, sold and marketed at cut rates ... to thus attract and secure
custom and patronage for other merchandise, and not for the purpose of
making or receiving a direct money profit."' 8 This conduct "injuriously
15. 220 U.S. at 394.
16. Id. at 375. In claiming that its distribution plan was intended to protect the "fair
profit" of the small dealers-the druggists who promoted its product-Dr. Miles alluded to a
property logic that had already appeared in the House debates over the Sherman Act. For
example, the Congressional Record reflects Representative Morse's concern that the 1888 Bill
would destroy the "contract system" of selling goods, "the intention of which is to fix a fair
and living profit to the merchant." 21 CONG. REC. 5954 (1890).
17. 220 U.S. at 381.
18. Id.
affected the reputation" of the product. 19 Consequently, sales of Dr.
Miles' patent medicine declined because "demand for its remedies largely
depended upon [the] goodwill and commendation" of druggists "and
their ability to realize a fair profit."' 20 In current antitrust parlance, this
tortious interference with contractual relations would label John D. Park
& Sons a "free rider" of the most despicable sort. The so-called "free
rider" appropriates good will created by the manufacturer and promot-
ing dealers by selling a product at a reduced price, possible in part be-
cause the free rider's costs do not include promotional activities. Still,
consumers clearly benefit from what is, after all, price competition, and
the manufacturer certainly receives a benefit from any sales of its own
products. But here, Dr. Miles' reputation was used to sell the products
of other manufacturers-a doubled free rider effect.
2 '
In evaluating Dr. Miles' claim, the Court focused on an entirely dif-
ferent issue-Dr. Miles' liberty and property rights to use a contract sys-
tem that restrained competition.22  The Court noted that "there are
opposing contentions as to the construction of the [restrictive] agree-
ments."' 23 Dr. Miles, the "Proprietor," contended that the agreements
were consignment and agency contracts, and that the goods were held
"for sale for the account of the Proprietor, the title thereto and property
therein to be and remain in the Proprietor."'2 4 In short, Dr. Miles argued
that a manufacturer has the right to fix the prices at which its agents sell
its property. While neither the defendant nor the Court disputed that
proposition,2 5 John D. Park & Sons claimed that the agreements were,
in effect, sales transactions and that Dr. Miles retained no effective prop-
erty interest.
2 6
Justice Hughes began his consideration of the consignment contract
issue by quoting Judge Lurton's opinion in the court below, which con-
sidered the agreements an effort "to disguise the wholesale dealers in the
19. Id. at 375.
20. Id. at 374-75.
21. The complaint also charged that the defendants "mutilated" Dr. Miles' property by
"obliterat[ing] the list of ailments and directions for use." Id.
22. Id. at 385, 390-91.
23. Id. at 395.
24. Id. at 376, 396 (quoting petitioner's charge).
25. Thus, it appears everyone agreed that a property claim of title retention overrides the
literalist principle, developed in earlier horizontal cartel cases, that competition is the only
legitimate arbiter of price. But unlike the broad discretion granted under the "rule of reason,"
Dr. Miles required a narrowly circumscribed property interest to entitle a manufacturer to set
resale prices. For a description of a general shift from a title theory of property to a contract
theory, see M. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 162
(1977).
26. 220 U.S. at 389.
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mask of agency" and which concluded that "the jobber must be regarded
as the general owner and engaged in selling for himself."' 27 After juxta-
posing provisions in the contract with the plaintiff's "inconsistent gen-
eral allegations" in the bill, the Court finessed the ownership question of
who held title with a narrow pleading issue: because Dr. Miles failed to
aver that Park & Sons acquired the patent medicine from a consignee,
the Court had no basis for Dr. Miles' claim that it retained title to the
goods in question. 28 Thus, the Court proceeded on the assumption that
Park & Sons acquired title to the goods, regardless of whether the agree-
ments were enforceable agency or consignment contracts.
29
Dissenting, Justice Holmes saw no merit in the Court's formalistic
consideration of the consignment issue. He pointed out that a few simple
changes in contract terms would allow Dr. Miles and other manufactur-
ers to fashion airtight agency or consignment agreements and to avoid
pleading pitfalls as well.30 With such changes in consignment contracts,
manufacturers could safely fix prices. Indeed, Justice Holmes believed
that Dr. Miles Medical Company's agreements should have been en-
forced as consignment contracts. Nonetheless, Justice Hughes concluded
for the majority that the price cutter could have "acquired title" without
any malicious interference.
31
Having disposed of Dr. Miles' claim of title to the goods, the Court's
opinion abruptly shifted from property to competition rhetoric: "the
complainant seeks to control not merely the prices at which its agents
may sell its products, but the prices for all sales by all dealers ... and
thus to fix the amount which the consumer shall pay, eliminating all
competition."' 32 The Court's view seems to make good sense: restraining
competition meant fixing the price of someone else's property. "Thus, a
combination between the manufacturer, the wholesalers and the retailers
to maintain prices and stifle competition has been brought about."'33 The
tension between competition and property logics was mediated by
privileging the latter: a property owner has the right to restrain competi-
tion by fixing a price for its goods. No one else does. The problem, of
27. Id. at 395 (citing Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 164 F. 803, 805
(6th Cir. 1908)).
28. Id. at 397-98.
29. Id. at 397-99. The agreement allows sales between wholesalers. Park & Sons could
have purchased the goods and received title, consistent with the agreement, from a wholesaler
who purchased from another wholesaler.
30. Id. at 411.
31. Id. at 397-98.
32. Id. at 399.
33. Id. at 400 (quoting petitioner's charge).
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course, lay in determining what constitutes property ownership. Dr.
Miles claimed that he maintained ownership of the goods through con-
signment and agency contracts. Although Dr. Miles lost on this issue,
the Court did recognize that retention of title in goods gives the title-
holder property rights that withstand the attack of competition logic.
Only after clearing the discursive space of these property claims could
competition rhetoric transform Dr. Miles' plan from the unilateral action
of "agents" into the concerted action of a "combination." It was this
doctrinal swing from consignment to sale that enabled the Court to reach
competition's logical conclusion: "That these agreements restrain trade is
obvious."
34
The Court considered two further claims that Dr. Miles retained
effective property ownership in the goods. Both claims were urged in
support of the contention that the restrictions, though sales, "are not
invalid either at common law or under the Act of Congress of July 2,
1890."'3 5 First, Dr. Miles claimed that it "manufactures medicines under
secret formulas which are its exclusive property. '36 By analogy to the
copyright and patent laws' creation of statutory monopolies, "[t]rade
secrets and articles embodying them are property monopolies and con-
tracts relating thereto [are] not within the restraint of trade rule."' 37 In
response, Park & Sons argued that "persons having only common-law
rights can[not] make a contract warrantable only under the patent and
copyright laws."'3 8 In agreeing with Park & Sons' distinction between
common-law and statutory property rights, the Court stated that
"whatever rights the patentee may enjoy are derived from statutory
grant."' 39 A "monopoly of production" in the form of a trade secret
"does not enlarge [the] right of property" in the patent medicine. 4° In
the absence of such enlarged rights, there is a "public interest in main-
taining freedom of trade ... after ... the producer has parted with his
title."' 41 Though the common law recognized that trade secret holders
had special rights analogous to those of patent holders, the Court refused
34. Id. at 400.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 386.
37. Id. at 387.
38. Id. at 390.
39. Id. at 401.
40. Id. at 403. For an application of the production-sale distinction to draw the line
between intrastate and interstate commerce, see United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895). But see United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949)
("If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation
which applies the squeeze.").
41. 220 U.S. at 403.
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to recognize any property right in the trade secret holder to restrain com-
petition. The Court's distinction in this context between trade secret
property rights and patent based property rights was arbitrary, in the
sense that its choice to treat them differently seems no more plausible
than does treating them similarly. Certainly the Court gives no reason
beyond their asserted difference. Yet, we recognize intellectual property
rights in trade secrets and would not be shocked if the Court had in-
cluded among such rights a right to control the distribution of goods
embodying a trade secret. The effect of the Court's arbitrary though
plausible distinction was to reject the claim that Dr. Miles could protect
itself and its dealers from the competition of John D. Park & Sons.
The final argument that Dr. Miles retained property ownership in
the goods was that "irrespective of the secrecy of its process, [it] is enti-
tled to maintain the restrictions [because] they relate to products of its
own manufacture." 42 Park & Sons responded that the contract system is
not only "in general restraint of trade and is therefore unlawful at com-
mon law," but also "illegal under the provisions of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act."' 43 The Court also rejected Dr. Miles' final claim, first observ-
ing that it was not founded in a common-law property right, but rather
"is sought to be derived from the liberty of the producer." 44 Without a
property logic to impel it, the Court was not willing to act on this im-
pulse toward liberty. In concluding that the restriction was "a general
restraint upon alienation [which] is ordinarily invalid," the opinion
turned for authority to Lord Coke's views on common-law property
rights:
The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a right of
general property in movables .... "If a man," says Lord Coke, in 2
Coke on Littleton, § 360, "be possessed of a horse or any other chattel
... and give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon condi-
tion that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void,
because his whole interest and property is out of him .... -45
The Court likened Dr. Miles' vertical price restraint to a highly dis-
favored general restraint on alienation-that is, a sale conditioned on a
promise not to resell. This characterization of the contract system in
question recognized a property logic at work, but attributed its power to
retailers like John D. Park & Sons, who held title to Dr. Miles' patent
medicine. Thus, whatever right Dr. Miles had depended "not upon an
42. Id. at 404.
43. Id. at 390, 392.
44. Id. at 404.
45. Id. (citing John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 39 (6th Cir. 1907)).
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inherent power incident to production and original ownership, but upon
agreement."
46
Having disposed of three property ownership claims, Justice Hughes
concluded his review of the common law with a dismissal of the claim,
now based on "agreement"-that is, on a liberty of contract right to set
prices. He wrote that "to sustain the restraint, it must be found to be
reasonable. ' 47 But, having already made the citation to Coke on Lit-
tleton and the inference that fixing resale prices constitutes a general re-
straint upon alienation at common law, the Court simply held this
agreement in restraint of trade unreasonable, because "interference with
individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of trade of them-
selves [are] void."'48 In sum, protecting liberty in trading meant protect-
ing the common-law property interest holder: "[t]he agreements are
designed to maintain prices, after the complainant has parted with the
title to the articles, and to prevent competition among those who trade in
them."' 49 Park & Sons enjoyed the liberty of contract right to set prices
because they held common-law title to the goods.
Given the Court's requirement of an effective property right to legit-
imate a restraint of trade, the reference to Coke on Littleton, a corner-
stone of the common law, is significant for two reasons. First, this
common-law analysis of property rights turned the tables on the literal-
ists who, like Justice Harlan in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 5 0
brushed off property arguments. Justice Hughes' analysis proceeds from
the assumption that competition policy must yield to fundamental prop-
erty rights. Second, under this common-law analysis, Park & Sons' right
to set a price was "one of the essential incidents of a right of general
property in movables. ' ' 5' The implication is that price competition de-
pends upon enforcement of property rights. Thus, while the Court was
affirming a public interest in competitive markets, it was embedding that
interest in a property rhetoric close to the rule of reason position argued
most urgently in the Northern Securities dissenting opinions.52 Another
way of describing the effect of Justice Hughes' opinion is that it affirmed
a judicial mandate to protect fundamental individual rights of property
from unreasonable legislative imposition of competition policy, an impli-
46. Id. at 405.
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id. The common law also had developed exceptions relating to the sale of an interest
in a business or process. Id.
49. Id. at 407.
50. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 321-24.
51. 220 U.S. at 411-12.
52. Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 324.
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cation made explicit in the following term's Standard Oil Co. v. United
States opinion.
53
Thus, the Dr. Miles property rhetoric, animated by an impulse to-
ward liberty, should not be confused with the earlier literalist jurispru-
dence of "full and free competition," though both seem to maintain a
political economy of independent entrepreneurs who have the freedom to
set their own prices. The literalists, whose jurisprudence exercised a
competition logic animated by an impulse toward equality, might have
declared the entire consignment-sale distinction an irrelevant property
argument. In short, the literalists had a primary commitment to compe-
tition, no matter what the property consequences. For example, the liter-
alists wanted competitive markets, even if government-imposed
competition resulted in regulation of property ownership, as it did in the
Northern Securities case and as it would have done in subordinating con-
signment contracts to competition policy. In contrast, Justice Hughes in
Dr. Miles wrote an opinion whose primary concern was the allocation of
property rights between producer and dealer. Competitive markets were
seen as a natural consequence of the rightful exercise of common-law
property rights.
It is easy to see why the Court was not concerned with Justice
Holmes' observation that manufacturers could easily formulate enforcea-
ble consignment contracts and restrain competition among independent
entrepreneurs like Park & Sons. Consignment agreements were seen as
proper vehicles for the exercise of an individual's fundamental right to
control the disposition of her property. Competition simply had to take
a back seat to this common-law right. In contrast, a literalist of the old
stripe would have been concerned with Justice Holmes' view because,
regardless of the common law, a consignment was a contract in restraint
of trade, and every contract in restraint of trade violated the Sherman
Act as construed by the literalists.
The last task remaining for Justice Hughes was to evaluate Park &
Sons' defense that the resale price fixing agreement was illegal under the
Sherman Act. Because all precedent under the Act involved horizontal
restraints, it was probably no surprise that the Court looked to the rela-
tionship between horizontal price-fixing and the resale price maintenance
at issue. As a context for the Sherman Act analysis, it is useful to recall
that Dr. Miles claimed that Park & Sons' discounting injured its reputa-
tion and business, and maliciously interfered with an agreement intended
to assure a "fair profit" to dealers in order to encourage their promo-
53. 221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911); see Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 321-24.
tional efforts, upon which Dr. Miles' success depended. The Court ig-
nored the benefits to Dr. Miles, concerned instead that "the enlarged
profits which would result from adherence to the established rates would
go to ... the favored dealers."
54
As authority under the Sherman Act, Justice Hughes cited United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 55 in which Judge Taft formulated a
distinction between direct and ancillary restraints as the proper mode of
analyzing horizontal price fixing under the statute.5 6 Though there was
no discussion of the case as authority, two points are clear. First, be-
cause Dr. Miles did not retain title in the goods at issue, the restraint had
no property right to which to be ancillary. Thus, it had to be a direct
restraint. This implication parallels the common-law authority of Coke
on Littleton regarding restraints on alienation. Second, because the ben-
efit of "enlarged profits" to the favored dealers resembled the benefit to
the price fixing cartel in Addyston Pipe, it too had to be illegal per se
under the Sherman Act. Hence, Dr. Miles could "fare no better with its
plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions
• . . by agreement with each other."1
57
The Court concluded that Dr. Miles' plan, now characterized as an
agreement among property holders (dealers), fell into the Sherman Act
category of "agreements or combinations between dealers, having for
their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fixing of
prices."58 Vertical agreements to restrain intrabrand competition, like
horizontal agreements to restrain the interbrand variety, constituted pri-
vate price fixing-an impermissible interference with the role of competi-
tion as the arbiter of price. The opinion closes with a final reference to
the relationship between property and competition logics: "where com-
modities have passed into the channels of trade and are owned by deal-
ers,.... the public is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from
competition in the subsequent traffic."
'59
54. 220 U.S. at 407. Though both the Dr. Miles Company and favored dealers benefit or
suffer injury in parallel fashion (if the claim of dependence on dealer good will be believed), the
Court nonetheless felt free in its analysis to ignore the benefit to the producer, because the
producer had not retained title and thus had no rightful claim to a benefit.
55. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
56. 220 U.S. at 408.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 408-09.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
March 1989] GENEALOGY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE
Judge Taft's distinction between direct and ancillary restraints, pro-
posed in Addyston Pipe, was crucial for Justice Hughes' analysis. It
served as the connection between restraints at common law and those
under the Sherman Act, and as the connection between vertical and hori-
zontal price fixing agreements. This distinction, in a fashion similar to
the restraint on alienation defined in Coke on Littleton, served as a doctri-
nal mediation between the competition and property logics. Under this
distinction, if there is no supporting property right, a restraint is direct
and unenforceable, and competition may not be restrained. If there is an
underlying property right, a restraint is ancillary and enforceable, and
competition may be restrained. In both cases, it is the individual prop-
erty owner who has the right to dispose of her property, which includes
the freedom to set the sale price. Competition depends upon property
holders exercising their individual rights to set prices for their goods.
Thus, agreements between rival property owners are a restraint of
competition.
The problem with this formulation is how to resolve the question of
property rights. While any given determination of property rights might
make sense, the cumulative process of determining property rights is ar-
bitrary. For example, the Court could have accepted Dr. Miles' claim
that its common-law trade secret rights should, like patent rights, allow
it to restrain competition in its products. Alternatively, it could have
defined more narrowly the rights of a patent holder to restrain competi-
tion. Each alternative is highly plausible and, in that sense, arbitrary.
Nonetheless, one of the arbitrary alternatives had to be chosen, Justice
Holmes notwithstanding, to maintain the tension between competition
and property logics. If not, the logic given priority could annihilate the
other. For example, if the Court had accepted Dr. Miles' argument that
its trade secret ownership should allow it to restrain competition, then
the increase in effective property rights would constrict the area for com-
petitive forces. If the Court had accepted Dr. Miles' argument that its
ownership of the patent medicine at the time of manufacture entitled it to
restrain competition, then there would have been no room for competi-
tion. Competition logic would have been annihilated.
Another way of understanding the problem with defining property
rights is to recast it as a question of how to identify the entity that holds
the property right. Vertical restraints doctrine can be viewed as a series
of attempts to resolve this entity problem. For example, if a transaction
is characterized as a consignment, then the dealers are agents of a princi-
pal-the manufacturer. Price fixing ancillary to the consignment is noth-
ing more than the principal's individual exercise of property rights. But
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if the transaction is characterized as a sale, then the dealers are property
owners who, under the common law and the Sherman Act, must exercise
their property rights individually. Whether vertical or horizontal, an
agreement in restraint of trade is illegal because it means that the re-
straint is not an exercise of individual property rights. As the Court in
Dr. Miles stated, the owner's liberty of contract right does not support a
restraint of competition. 60 Vertical restraints doctrines can be under-
stood as a series of attempts to mediate the tension between property and
competition logics.
In his dissent, Justice Holmes was willing to take the final step that
the majority refused to take. He argued that liberty of contract, even
without an underlying property right, should provide a sufficient basis
for restraining competition. Offering a shorthand rendition of the expan-
sive liberty of contract rhetoric already aired in his Northern Securities
dissent, Justice Holmes declared that, regardless of who holds title, "the
most enlightened judicial policy is to let people manage their own busi-
ness in their own way, unless the ground for interference is very clear."
'6'
He stated further that when liberty of contract is the standard by which
to judge restraints, there is no clear basis for choosing among the "origi-
nator," "first vendor," or "subordinate vendor" of the product because
they all had such rights. Moreover, the "interest of the consumer"
should fare no better, because "we greatly exaggerate the value and im-
portance to the public of competition in the production or distribution of
an article ... as fixing a fair price."'62 Thus, according to Justice Holmes,
the Court had no clear ground for interfering with the agreements be-
tween Dr. Miles and its dealers.
Justice Holmes concluded his dissenting opinion with a reference to
"fair price." But in contrast to the equalizing impulse working in the
legislative debates and in Dr. Miles' complaint, which called for a policy
of protecting fair profit to the independent entrepreneur, Justice Holmes'
notion of a "fair price" was shaped by his commitment to liberty of con-
tract. For Justice Holmes, "fair price" meant "the point of most profita-
ble returns" 63 or monopoly price. The appropriate place for rivalry was
the "competition of conflicting desires" or in today's terms, elasticity of
demand. 64 In other words, this concept of freedom of contract would
60. Id. at 407.
61. Id. at 411.
62. Id. at 411-12.
63. Id. at 412.
64. Id.; cf S. PATTEN, THEORY OF PROSPERITY 60 (1902) (arguing that "consumers'
power of substitution" brings prices down in monopoly markets).
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allow the manufacturer to restrain competition between dealers, regard-
less of who holds title to the property in question. For Justice Holmes,
free competition meant freedom from judicial enforcement of common-
law doctrine regarding restraints of trade. It meant unconditional free-
dom to restrain intrabrand competition by resale price maintenance
agreements.
In summary, Dr. Miles is important for several reasons. First, it
introduced the three doctrinal threads that have tied together vertical
price restraint opinions since 1911: the consignment-sale distinction; the
unilateral or concerted nature of the restraint; and the "free rider"
thread. Moreover, both the majority and the dissent agreed that compe-
tition logic must be subordinated to fundamental property rights, taken
from common-law doctrines such as consignment and agency contracts.
Finally, although Dr. Miles stands for the proposition that resale price
maintenance is illegal per se under the Sherman Act, it should not be
mistaken for a continuation of literalist jurisprudence. This Court was
primarily concerned with setting clear limits for competition logic's in-
trusion into a regime of property rights.
B. Liberty of Contract and Unilateral Terminations
Eight years later in United States v. Colgate & Co., 65 a post-rule of
reason Court again took up the doctrine of agreement, this time embrac-
ing the liberty of contract logic from Justice Holmes' dissent in Dr. Miles.
Though highly attenuated for over sixty years, the Colgate doctrine,
which stands for the proposition that a unilateral refusal to deal does not
violate the Sherman Act, has regained its vigor in recent Court
opinions.
66
In Colgate, the Court reviewed the adequacy of a criminal indict-
ment, as authored by the Justice Department and as interpreted by the
trial court.67 The indictment alleged that "the defendant ... created and
engaged in a combination with said wholesale and retail dealers ... for
the purpose and with the effect of procuring adherence on the part of
such dealers ... to resale prices fixed by the defendant ... thus sup-
pressing competition amongst [them]."'6 In a unanimous opinion for the
Court, Justice McReynolds stated that the government "proceeds solely
65. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
66. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (discussed
infra text accompanying notes 159-79).
67. 250 U.S. at 306.
68. Id. at 302-03.
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upon the theory of an unlawful combination. ' 69 The government agreed,
claiming that the trial court's view of the indictment was consistent with
the combination doctrine of Dr. Miles.70 On the other side, Colgate &
Company argued that the trial court's opinion, taken as a whole, "con-
strues the indictment as alleging only recognition of the manufacturer's
undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone
who failed to maintain the same."'' v In short, the parties' opposed inter-
pretations derived from competition and property logics in conflict.
In construing the trial court's interpretation of the indictment, the
Supreme Court focused on the element of "combination." To put this
into context, the Court was confronted with an undisputed sale.. There
was no claim of consignment or agency, as there had been in Dr. Miles.
Were all price restraints accompanying sales to be treated as unreasona-
ble per se?
Most of the Court's spare opinion, which is less than seven pages
long, simply recites the lower court's language. Despite the govern-
ment's averment of combination, Justice McReynolds thought it signifi-
cant that the court below said: "No charge is made that any contract was
entered into."'72 This was a curious observation because the trial court
also viewed the indictment as presenting the question of whether Colgate
was subject to prosecution "because he agrees with his wholesale and
retail customers, upon prices claimed by them to be fair and reasonable,
at which the same may be resold, and declines to sell his products to
those Who will not thus stipulate as to prices."'73 The indictment further
alleged that, to carry out the purposes of the combination, Colgate
[d]istribut[ed] among dealers .. . lists showing uniform prices to be
charged; urging them to adhere to such prices and notices, stating that
no sales would be made to those who did not; ... requests to offending
dealers for assurances and promises of future adherence to prices,
which were often given; uniform refusals to sell to any who failed to
give the same; sales to those who did . . .74
69. Id. at 309.
70. Id. at 306.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 304.
73. Id. at 304-05 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 303. Note how this is not a simple refusal to deal, as it has been characterized.
Rather, the Colgate Company's conduct is very much like the conduct found to violate the
Sherman Act in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). For a typical view
that Parke, Davis is distinguishable by its program to enforce resale price maintenance, see
Calvani & Berg, Resale Price Maintenance after Monsanto: A Policy Still at War with Itself,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1163, 1173.
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Given that this course of dealing could amount to a combination to set a
price, what distinguishes it from a contract to set a price, such as the
transaction in Dr. Miles?
The trial judge characterized the indictment as presenting "for the
determination of the court how far one may control and dispose of his
own property. '75 This portrayal of the manufacturer's interest echoed
Justice Holmes' rhetoric of freedom of contract in Dr. Miles. "[A] manu-
facturer of a given article ... [may] refuse absolutely to sell the same at
any price, or to sell at a named sum to a customer, with the understand-
ing that such customer will resell only at an agreed price."' 76 While this
view seems to ignore the Dr. Miles majority's rejection of a "liberty"
claim, it does reflect the intervening Standard Oil opinion's rule of reason
jurisprudence, whose purpose was "to prevent [the Sherman Act] from
destroying all liberty of contract and all substantial right to trade."
'77
Nonetheless, according to Justice McReynolds, there was a difference be-
tween the plans of Dr. Miles Company and the plans of Colgate Com-
pany: in the former, "the unlawful combination was effected through
contracts which undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the
right to sell."' 78 Justice McReynolds' criterion was a liberty-based dis-
tinction between bilateral and other kinds of contracts. 79 Only in a bilat-
eral contract does a dealer explicitly promise to adhere to a price, in
exchange for the manufacturer's promise to sell goods to the dealer.
In this case, the government's indictment did not allege that "the
manufacturer and his customers bound themselves to enhance and main-
tain prices."80 The retailer never gave up its freedom of contract. "The
retailer, after buying, could, if he chose, give away his purchase, or sell it
at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all."181 In short, the retailer re-
tained the individual property right to set a price, and thus to compete.
Justice McReynolds was careful to point out that there was no charge
that the dealers had formed a cartel "or that the defendant acted other
than with his customers individually. '8 2 The Court was also willing, it
75. 250 U.S. at 304-05.
76. Id. at 305.
77. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911); see Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 63-66 (1911).
78. 250 U.S. at 307-08.
79. Traditional contract doctrine defines a bilateral contract as a bargain founded in an
exchange of promises. Other sorts of contractual liability do not derive from two parties bind-
ing themselves by exchanging promises. In a unilateral contract, only one party binds herself
by a promise to perform. Implied contracts need not include any promise.
80. 250 U.S. at 305.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 306.
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seems, to assume that the dealers' liberty to compete was not constrained
by the Colgate Company's market or bargaining power. The Court cau-
tioned that it was deciding a Sherman Act section 1 case. There was no
claim that Colgate monopolized the industry.8 3 In consequence, there
was no basis for assuming that dealers who competed and were termi-
nated lacked the opportunity to sell competing products. With no claim
of excessive market power held by Colgate, the Court seemed willing to
make the inference that there was essentially equal bargaining power be-
tween Colgate and its dealers. In tune with the new rule of reason juris-
prudence, this property-liberty logic wove a strong thread of agreement
that successfully held off the government's competition-based arguments.
Nonetheless, the close distinction between the Colgate and Dr. Miles
doctrines did not go unnoticed. The following term in United States v.
Schrader's Son, Inc., 8 4 the Court felt compelled to respond to a district
court judge who wrote:
Personally, and with all due respect, permit me to say that I can see no
real difference upon the facts between the Dr. Miles Company Case and
the Colgate Company Case. The only difference is that in the former
the arrangement for marketing its product was put in writing, whereas
in the latter the wholesale and retail dealers observed the prices fixed
by the vendor. This is a distinction without a difference. The tacit
acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is
the equivalent for all practical purposes of an express agreement. 85
In his response to the trial judge's consternation over the identical com-
petitive effects (fixed prices) of both schemes, Justice McReynolds could
only repeat the property-liberty logic of his Colgate opinion: "We had no
intention to overrule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles, where the effort
was to destroy the dealers' independent discretion through restrictive
agreements."'86 In other words, "the parties are combined through agree-
ments designed to take away the dealers' control of their own affairs and
thereby destroy competition. '87 The Court's concern with competitive
effects depended upon the prior satisfaction of demands imposed by the
rhetoric of freedom of contract.
88
83. Id. at 302.
84. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
85. Id. at 97 (citing United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio
1919)).
86. Id. at 99.
87. Id. at 99-100.
88. This analysis raises the contradiction of free competition: the notion of liberty can
mean freedom from governmental power or market power. The former rejects governmental
intervention while the latter calls for it. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 336-41.
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Though later cases consistently shortened the Colgate doctrine's
reach,8 9 it was never overruled. Despite its attenuation, a thread of
agreement in vertical restraints doctrine continued to support the propo-
sition that unilateral refusals to deal with discounting wholesalers or re-
tailers was permitted under the Sherman Act. 90
C. Consignments and Price Competition
In 1926, the Court reconsidered the consignment branch of the Dr.
Miles case in United States v. General Electric Co. 91 The facts of General
Electric supported a combination of property logics in restraint of com-
petition, a combination so powerful that General Electric's contracts fix-
ing resale prices were held legal per se.92
General Electric was owner of the three patents that "cover com-
pletely the making of the modem electric lights ... and secure to the
General Electric Company the monopoly of their making, using and
vending."' 93 General Electric and its major licensee, Westinghouse Com-
pany, controlled eighty-five percent of the total business in electric lights
in 1921.94 Aside from its own direct sales to large consumers, General
Electric's distribution plan consisted of "direct sales" of lamps on "con-
signment" and "negotiated by agents." 95 "All of the lamps in such con-
signed stock are to be and remain the property of the company until
sold." 96 Upon delivery of the lamps to purchaser, "the title passes di-
rectly from [General Electric] to those purchasers. ' 97 Consistent with its
ownership claim, General Electric "assumed all risk of fire, flood, obso-
lescence, and price decline, and carries whatever insurance is carried on
the stocks of lamps in the hands of its agents and pays what ever taxes
are assessed."98
89. See, ag., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968); United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-46 (1960).
90. The revival of this property-liberty logic in defense of dealer terminations is discussed
infra notes 159-79 and accompanying text.
91. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
92. Id. at 488.
93. Id. at 480-81. Under the patent law, "the patentee is given by statute a monopoly of
making, using and selling the patented article." Id. at 485.
94. Id. at 481. In addition, other licensees accounted for 8% and unlicensed manufactur-
ers accounted for 7%.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 482. The agreements also closed Dr. Miles' back door-its failure to restrict
wholesalers from selling to other wholesalers. Id. at 482, 484.
97. rd. at 484.
98. Id. at 483.
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The validity of the distribution plan turned "on the question
whether the sales are by the company through its agents to the consumer,
or are in fact by the company to the so-called agents at the time of con-
signment." 99 Justice Taft found no basis for treating the contracts as
anything other than the consignment agreements General Electric
claimed them to be. 1° ° That is, "the owner of an article patented or
otherwise is not violating the common law or the Anti-Trust Act by seek-
ing to dispose of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price
by which his agents transfer the title from him directly to such con-
sumer." 10 ' Whether the owner of a statutory patent monopoly or a se-
cret patent medicine formula, a company was entitled to use the
consignment agreement to restrain intrabrand competition in the article.
Justice Taft, who earlier had brought the common-law doctrine of
consignment to bear on analysis of horizontal restraints in his circuit
court opinion in Addyston Pipe, had no doubts about applying this doc-
trine to find General Electric's vertical restraints legal per se. 10 2 Cer-
tainly, the opinion could have upheld the restraint on the basis of the Dr.
Miles distinction between statutory patent rights and common-law prop-
erty rights. The General Electric Company's patent ownership consti-
tuted the statutory rights necessary to support the claim that the price
fixing agreements were ancillary to a cognizable property right. Justice
Taft, however, chose the much broader ground of common-law property
rights of consignment. This gesture assured the continuing dominance of
the rhetorical mode of property over its competition-based rival. In the
General Electric case, this dominance meant essentially that there would
be no competition at all, since intrabrand competition was avoided under
that case and there was no interbrand competition to speak of.
The title logic of property ownership rights continued to sanction
resale price maintenance, despite its restraint of the market's pricing
function, until Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of California 103 almost forty
years later. From Justice Stewart's scathing dissent to Professor Baxter's
recent characterization of the majority opinion as disingenuous, the
Court's opinion in Simpson has been maligned.' 0 4 When viewed as a
product of the conflict between competition and property logics, how-
99. Id. at 485.
100. Id. at 485-86.
101. Id. at 488. The remainder of the opinion analyzes the General Electric Company's
patent monopoly within the framework of Sherman Act § 2.
102. Id. at 493-94 (affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's bill).
103. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
104. Id. at 25 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doc-
trine, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 935 (1987).
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ever, Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court appears more candid and
begins to look instead like an ill-advised attempt at a perhaps impossible
task-to satisfy both logics.
In Simpson, a retail gasoline service station operator recovered
treble damages from the Union Oil Company, who terminated him after
he continued to sell gasoline at prices below that specified in the contract
of consignment. The Court found that the combined impact of these
annual leases of the station premises
coercively laced [the dealers] into an arrangement under which their
supplier is able to impose noncompetitive prices on thousands of per-
sons who otherwise might be competitive. The evil of this resale price
maintenance program ... is its inexorable potentiality for and even
certainty in destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline by these
nominal "consignees" who are in reality small struggling competitors
seeking retail gas customers.105
The opinion's fundamental problem is its reluctance to rely exclu-
sively upon the Court's new commitment to competition logic and in
turn to adopt entirely the radical normative shift from General Electric's
property logic. Instead, the Simpson opinion seeks to replicate the Dr.
Miles opinion's strategy of defusing the manufacturer's title-based claims
as a prelude to the Court's emphasis on competition logic. That strategy
was convincing in Dr. Miles because the Court attacked consignment
agreements that were not well drafted. But in Simpson, as in General
Electric, such attack lacked conviction because the consignments had
been fortified against precisely that strategy.
Before investigating the majority opinion's maligned assault on the
property logic of Union Oil Company's consignment scheme, it is worth
examining how the opinion formulates doctrine based on an explicit
commitment to the value of competition. The Court wrote that "a con-
signment, no matter how lawful it might be as a matter of private con-
tract law, must give way before the federal antitrust policy. o10 6 As
authority for the claim that competition constitutes that policy, Justice
Douglas cited his own opinion in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil
Co., the most extreme rendition of the rule that horizontal price fixing
agreements are illegal per se. 107 "The evil of this resale price mainte-
nance program... is its inexorable potentiality for and even certainty in
destroying competition in retail sales of gasoline .... -1o8 In short, the
opinion declares that the "antitrust policy expressed in Acts of Con-
105. 377 U.S. at 21.-
106. Id. at 18.
107. 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940) (Douglas, J.); see 377 U.S. at 21-22.
108. 377 U.S. at 21.
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gress" trumped the property rights associated with perfectly legal
consignments. '0 9
Thus, the Simpson opinion reinstates the old literalist maxim that
competition is the only legitimate arbiter of price, thereby establishing
competition as the predominant logic in vertical price restraints doctrine.
Consistent with Justice Harlan's Northern Securities rationale that Con-
gress has the power to regulate property rights to protect or impose com-
petition in interstate markets, °10 Justice Douglas formulated an
expansive logic of competition. This breadth is evident in the new con-
nection forged between intra- and interbrand competition. In Dr. Miles,
the connection was based on the presumed benefit to favored dealers re-
sulting from vertical price restraints. Since the dealers benefitted, the
vertical restraint was "just like" a horizontal agreement among dealers.
But here, the Court presumed instead that the manufacturer benefitted.
The combination of the consignment device used throughout the oil in-
dustry and the oligopoly structure of the industry at the manufacturer
level amounted to administered prices."'I In short, typically there was
price leadership rather than interbrand price competition. Thus, if there
was to be price competition, it had to occur at the dealer level. With
oligopoly pricing enforced by manufacturers' vertical price restraints,
there was no price competition at all. In the oil industry, intrabrand
competition at the dealer level was seen as the only way of promoting
interbrand competition. 112
But apparently this powerful competition logic did not provide a
sufficient basis for finding the arrangement illegal, perhaps because of the
extreme doctrinal shift from General Electric's per se legality to Simp-
son's per se illegality and this shift's implication that competition policy
would now override the logics of all common-law property rights. Cer-
tainly, consignment represented a well-settled and powerful form of these
rights. Could it simply be jettisoned? If so, perhaps all common-law
property rights could suffer the same fate. Justice Hughes' opinion in Dr.
Miles serves as an example of the arbitrariness of defining property
rights, and thus as the spectre of their demise. Given this threat to fun-
damental property rights, the Simpson opinion could not rely solely on
the normative shift from the title theory of property rights to the market
109. Id. at 18.
110. Northern See. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344, 351 (1904).
111. 377 U.S. at 22 n.9 (citing Berle, Bigness: Curse or Opportunity?. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18,
1962, Magazine, at 18, 55, 58).
112. See Comanor, supra note 2, for an elegant economic analysis of the relationship be-
tween interbrand and intrabrand competition in the typical contemporary form of rivalry-
monopolistic competition.
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pricing function associated with competition. It had to defuse the strong
property logic that produced the General Electric opinion's view that a
consignment renders resale price maintenance a per se reasonable re-
straint of trade. But it could not allow competition logic to annihilate its
property counterpart. The Court sought a new doctrinal mediation to
keep property logic alive, by distinguishing the property logic of the cur-
rent case from that in General Electric in two ways.
First, despite a distribution plan remarkably similar to General
Electric's agency and consignment network, Justice Douglas portrayed
the Union Oil Company scheme as a "[c]oercive type of 'consignment'
agreement .... ,"113 "By reason of the lease and 'consignment' agreement
dealers are coercively laced into an arrangement" to fix prices.1
14
Although the Court left the element of coercion vague when it stated that
"[i]t matters not what the coercive device is,"' 115 the opinion's internal
logic is clear enough: the consignment device impinged upon the dealers'
liberty, their "right of alienation," to borrow a phrase from Lord Coke,
by way of Justice Hughes' opinion in Dr. Miles. 116 Here, too, the re-
straint was illegal per se because the Court dissolved the manufacturer's
underlying property interest. There was "nothing" to which the restraint
could be ancillary. At the same time, the possibility of common-law
property rights was not annihilated-at least in the abstract, noncoercive
consignments were possible. More importantly, however, the common-
law regime of private property rights survived. The paramount signifi-
cance of its survival is most clearly illustrated when the focus shifts from
manufacturer to dealer. For it is the dealers' individual property rights
that empower them to set their own prices and thus to compete. It is the
tension between competition and property logics that produces vertical
restraints doctrine and its underlying political economy. Thus, this ten-
sion between them must survive.
113. 377 U.S. at 24.
114. Id. at 21.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Justice Stewart's dissent recognized the implications of subordinating a title logic to a
liberty logic of operative property rights. Disagreeing with the lower court's liberty-based
view, which characterized the consignment as Simpson's "own free and deliberate choice," id.
at 25 (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 311 F.2d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 1964)), the dissent
insisted on the General Electric rationale: "control over price flows from the simple fact that
the owner of the goods... has the unquestioned right to determine the price at which he will
sell them." Id. at 29. Justice Stewart also pointed out that the coercive nature of a consign-
ment is a question of fact to be determined on remand. Id. at 26. Justices Brennan and
Goldberg agreed. Id. at 31. Furthermore, Justice Stewart seemed to recognize the underlying
competition logic that produced the majority's concern with coercion, reminding them that the
competitive effects of price restraints accompanying consignments are immaterial. Id. at 28
(citing United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926)).
Although Justice Stewart in his dissent argued persuasively that, in
comparing the General Electric Company and Union Oil Company con-
signment plans, purported "differences [in] tax and insurance burdens
... disappear,"" 17 the Court gave great significance to the fact that Simp-
son "[m]ust carry personal liability and property damage insurance by
reason of the 'consigned' gasoline and is responsible for all losses of the
'consigned' gasoline in his possession."' 1 8 In short, the majority took
those facts as evidence against the manufacturer's title theory of owner-
ship. Later, the implications of this evidence were made explicit:
Dealers, like Simpson, are independent businessmen; and they
have all or most of the indicia of entrepreneurs, except for price fixing.
The risk of loss of the gasoline is on them .... Their return is affected
by the rise and fall in the market price, their commissions declining as
retail prices drop. Practically the only power they have to be wholly
independent businessmen ... is taken from them by the proviso that
they must sell their gasoline at prices fixed by Union Oil."19
In other words, despite a dealer's assumption of all the risks of commit-
ting property to the rigors of competition, the Union Oil Company re-
strained the liberty of the dealer to dispose of that property. Each dealer
had exchanged her liberty of contract for the right to sell Union oil. In
evaluating this transaction between the manufacturer and the dealers,
Justice Douglas took the expanded liberty-property logic of the Holmes
dissent in Dr. Miles and turned it on its head. Whereas Justice Holmes
argued that this logic rendered a manufacturer's price restraints reason-
able, though he did not retain title, Justice Douglas argued that it ren-
dered a manufacturer's restraints unreasonable, despite his retention of
title. In the process, Justice Holmes' argument (and the rule of reason's
logic as well) was transformed from a libertarian anti-interventionism
into a Jeffersonian entrepreneurial defense of intrabrand competition.
In contrast to the first way in which Justice Douglas sought to
defuse the power of the General Electric opinion's property logic, his sec-
ond method involved a candid recharacterization of General Electric as a
patent case:
The Court in the General Electric case did not restrict its ruling to
patented articles; it, indeed, said that the use of the consignment device
was available to the owners of articles "patented or otherwise." But
whatever may be said of the General Electric case on its special facts,
involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here.' 20
117. 377 U.S. at 26 n.1.
118. Id. at 15.
119. Id. at 20-21.
120. Id. at 23 (citation omitted).
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Implicit in the reference to patents as "special facts" is the sense
that they entail a stronger property interest than do common-law con-
signments. Patents are a statutory monopoly, founded in explicit consti-
tutional language, and Dr. Miles recognized them as more compelling
than common-law trade secret rights. 121 Here, Justice Douglas applied
the same logic to common-law consignment rights. The problems with
that logic, discussed earlier, reappear here as well. The problem of arbi-
trariness in defining property rights now takes the form of distinguishing
coercive from noncoercive consignments. Moreover, the opinion's refer-
ence to "special facts here" compounds the problem: is the reference
limited to the domain of property and coercive consignments, or does it
also refer to the domain of competition and oligopoly markets? While
drawing a wavering line to mediate between the two logics in conflict, the
Court is clear about the power of statutory property rights of patent
holders: "[L]ong prior to the General Electric case, price fixing in the
marketing of patented articles had been condoned, provided it did not
extend to sales."' 122 In short, competition logic prevailed here and would
prevail again when confronting common-law property logics in defense
of resale price maintenance. The further 'exception of "special facts" was
given little substance.
In sum, Simpson clearly and straightforwardly limited the General
Electric property logic to its patent-related "special facts," despite the
earlier opinion's explicitly broader holding. Nonetheless, Justice Doug-
las seemed reluctant simply to subordinate all common-law property
rights to competition policy, perhaps because of the great doctrinal leap
from the earlier standard of per se legality to the revised standard of per
se illegality of resale price maintenance associated with consignments.
The danger of that doctrinal leap was the implication that competition
logic would now trump all common-law property rights. Thus, the
Court felt compelled to characterize the Union Oil Company's plan as a
"coercive type of 'consignment,' "123 despite the plan's effective identity
with the General Electric Company's plan, whose title theory of property
rights had produced the earlier doctrine of per se legality.
D. Common-Law Property Rights and Intrabrand Competition
The Simpson opinion shook loose a cornerstone of the common-law
property regime when it subordinated a titleholder's rights to those of a
consignee. Although the Court limited its holding to "coercive assign-
121. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
122. 377 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
123. Id.
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ments," the message was clear: these traditional property rights no
longer guaranteed that a manufacturer could safely restrain price compe-
tition among its dealers. A few years later, in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 124
the Court examined the fundamental liberty to choose one's own busi-
ness partners. After Albrecht, little would remain of the Colgate doc-
trine, which protected the manufacturer's right to terminate an
uncooperative dealer, so long as the action is unilateral.
Justice White, writing for the Court, produced a notion of "agree-
ment" so expansive that few dealer terminations thereafter could be
viewed as unilateral actions. The opinion limited the manufacturer's lib-
erty of contract, by refining the logic that Justice Douglas employed in
Simpson to eliminate consignment as a safe harbor for enforceable price
fixing. Justice White's analysis in Albrecht made it clear that both opin-
ions subordinated the manufacturer's liberty to set a price to the dealer's
liberty to set it. The cumulative effect of individual dealers setting prices
would be price competition. This redistribution of property rights from
manufacturers to dealers carried with it an equalizing effect similar to the
old "literalist" logic of competition, animated by a desire to maintain a
class of "small dealers and worthy men." In the old railroad cartel cases,
the class was protected from powerful combinations of rivals. In dealer
termination cases, it would be protected from large individual producers
or dealers. The common thread was a commitment to competitive mar-
kets, animated by a belief that equalizing market power was the precon-
dition for industrial liberty or free competition. 125
Albrecht was one of many "independent carriers" who bought
morning newspapers from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat at wholesale
prices. These carriers sold the papers at retail "in exclusive territories
which are subject to termination if prices exceed the suggested maxi-
mum" as advertised by the publisher, the Herald Company. 126 After Al-
brecht had increased the charge to his 1200 customers by ten cents a
month, the Herald Company warned Albrecht that it would solicit his
readers. The publisher first sent letters to Albrecht's customers, then
hired Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. to help solicit these customers. The
Herald Company later gave to another carrier, George Kroner, the 314
customers who accepted the offer of a lower price. 127 In response to the
124. 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see also United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45-46
(1960) (manufacturer's refusal to deal with wholesalers in order to elicit their willingness to
deny manufacturer's products to retailers violated the Sherman Act).
125. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 314-20.
126. 390 U.S. at 147.
127. Id. The transfer of customers was subject to return, should Albrecht comply with the
price-fixing agreement. Raising serious questions about assumptions regarding the price-con-
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Herald Company's offer to return the customers to Albrecht if he "dis-
continued his pricing practice," Albrecht filed suit, charging Herald
Company with tortious interference with contractual relations, as well as
"a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act." 128 Albrecht's distributorship was canceled, and he sold his
route of 900 remaining customers.129
Albrecht charged a combination between the Herald Company and
"plaintiff's customers and/or Milne Circulation Sales, Inc. and/or
George Kroner."' 130 The jury found for the Herald Company; the trial
judge denied Albrecht's motion for judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict; and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the defendant's
"conduct was wholly unilateral." 131 In reversing, Justice White wrote
that "§ 1 of the Sherman Act ... covers combinations in addition to
contracts and conspiracies .... ,,132 Overrunning the Colgate case's
ground, though not overturning its rule, the Court declared that a combi-
nation arises when "acquiescence in the suggested prices was secured by
threats of termination .... "133 For the Colgate Court, "proceed[ing]
solely upon the theory of an unlawful combination" was insufficient be-
cause no averment had been made that "the manufacturer, and his cus-
tomer, bound themselves to enhance and maintain prices .... ,,134 In
Albrecht as well, there was no binding agreement. Tacit acquiescence,
however, was now an effective proxy for a binding agreement. 
35
Justice Harlan in his dissent disagreed with the majority's recogni-
tion of tacit acquiescence as a binding agreement. He argued that the
Herald Company's "activity was in its essence unilateral"' 36 and re-
minded the Court that "it is quite proper for a firm to set its own
prices."' 137 Justice Harlan believed that the conduct was unilateral be-
cause he viewed Milne and Kroner as Herald Company agents rather
sciousness of consumers, only 314 of 1200 customers contacted by Milne switched to the lower
priced distributor. Id.
128. Id. at 148.
129. Id. at 148 & n.5. Albrecht sought damages for the loss of 314 customers. Id. at 147.
130. Id. at 148 (quoting Plaintiff's Complaint).
131. Id. at 148-49.
132. Id. at 149.
133. Id. (citing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1960)).
134. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 302, 305 (1919).
135. Tacit acquiescence is a proxy for agreement, at least when secured by threats of ter-
mination, whose inference is easily made. This view parallels the Simpson decision's character-
ization of Union Oil Company's distribution plan as founded in "coercive consignments." The
doctrine of coercion is a traditional contract defense to rescind agreements, founded in the
notion that coercion precludes voluntariness.
136. 390 U.S. at 161.
137. Id. at 160.
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than independent entities. He compared the Herald Company's action to
"pay[ing] one of its own employees to perform a routine task, or hir[ing]
an outsider to do the same thing .... -138 The majority, on the other
hand, refused to recognize this common-law right to hire agents to per-
form services. This refusal was akin to the Simpson Court's denial of the
common-law right to designate agents to sell goods on consignment.
In both Simpson and Albrecht, the Court resolved the issue of defin-
ing the property holder by the process of individuation. That is, property
rights were attributed to individuals rather than entities, and to smaller
rather than larger entities. The importance of producer size is not clear,
although the disparities in bargaining power between Mr. Simpson and
the Union Oil Company, and between Mr. Albrecht and the Herald Pub-
lishing Company, appear to be enormous. As in the Simpson opinion,
the suggestion in Albrecht that liberty depends on rough equality is remi-
niscent of the "literalist" jurisprudence in the formative years. The dif-
ference lies in the modern Court's implicit recognition of the need to
confront and maintain an underlying regime of property rights.
Here, the Court began by treating the Herald Company and Milne
and Kroner as independent entities, each of whom entered into an agree-
ment to restrain Albrecht's individual property or liberty right to set a
price for his newspapers. In refusing to enforce an "agreement" that re-
strained those individual rights, the opinion allowed its property logic of
individuation to proliferate "agreements": 139
[P]etitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent and
himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respon-
dent's advertised price. Likewise, he might successfully have claimed
that respondent had combined with the other carriers .... Petitioner's
amended complaint did allege a combination between respondent and
petitioner's customers. [This] was not ... a frivolous contention. 140
Thus, the pleading requirement of a "combination or conspiracy" in re-
straint of trade was satisfied simply by alleging that the publisher com-
bined with independent contractors, or with the terminated dealer's
customers, or even with the terminated dealer. It is hard to imagine any
dealer termination case that would fail for lack of concerted action.
Justice White's opinion for the majority holds much in common
with the old literalist logic of competition, impelled by an impulse to-
ward equalizing market power. Justices Peckham and Harlan (the elder)
138. Id.
139. Milne's "aware[ness] that the aim of the solicitation campaign was to force petitioner
to lower his price" and Kroner's knowledge that his participation "materially aided in the
accomplishment of respondent's plan." Id. at 150.
140. Id. at 150 n.6.
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believed that industrial liberty required the breakup of cartels and trusts
because of their effects on the process of competition and on a class of
competitors called "small dealers and worthy men." 141 The literalists
turned aside all arguments based on injury to the property rights of those
who entered into contracts in restraint of competition. They believed
that the equalization of market power and the proliferation of competi-
tors would have the natural consequence of enhancing industrial and
political liberty, the consequence called for by the Sherman Act. Justices
Douglas and White wrote opinions for the modem Court that reintro-
duced this impulse toward equalization. They redirected the equaliza-
tion impulse, however, to redistribute bargaining power between large
producers and small distributors. In both cases, there was no intimation
of complaints from other distributors, either individually or in combina-
tion. This Court invoked a process of redistribution to equalize individ-
ual rights of liberty and property.
The modem majority believed that a consequence of a proliferation
of rights holders would be the enhancement of competition-both intra-
and interbrand. Although this assumption seemed to hold in Simpson as
applied to the oil industry, the proliferation of rights holders does not
necessarily entail enhancement of competition. One need only recall that
Albrecht's exercise of this right to set a price would not lead to any com-
petition because all carriers of the Globe-Democrat had exclusive territo-
ries. Justice Harlan made much of the exclusive territories provision in
arguing that the agreement between the Herald Company and Albrecht
should not even be treated as a price fixing agreement. 142 Indeed, Justice
Stewart and the court below agreed that this fixing of a maximum price
should be seen as the setting of a "fair price" to the consumer, in the
absence of competition.1 43
The Court responded as the literalists might have to this argument,
heard long ago in the legislative debates and in the "ruinous competi-
tion" arguments of the railroad cartel cases. 44 Justice White wrote that
if "the economic impact of territorial exclusivity was such that the public
could be protected only by otherwise illegal price fixing itself injurious to
the public, the entire scheme must fall under § 1 of the Sherman Act." 145
If price competition required the elimination of both the territorial provi-
sion and the price ceiling, then the Court was prepared to find the entire
141. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
142. 390 U.S. at 166-67.
143. Id. at 168.
144. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 291-303.
145. 390 U.S. at 154.
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agreement illegal per se. 146 In sharp contrast to the dissenting Justices'
view that the Herald Company's restraint was in the best interests of the
public, the majority proceeded on the assumption that the public interest
depended upon the dealers' individual property rights and the price com-
petition that would follow. 1
47
This difference of opinion about the best way to serve the public
interest can be understood as a disagreement about the implications of
individual liberty. Justice Harlan urged the Court to take a different
view of the price restraint's competitive effects by rethinking the relation-
ship between liberty and competition. He began by asserting that to de-
cide the case, someone's liberty had to give way: either Albrecht could
exercise his liberty to set a price or the Herald Company could exercise
its liberty to contract with its dealers. One or the other would have to
give way. In order to pose the question purely in terms of the price re-
straint, however, Justice Harlan had to sidestep the issue of territorial
exclusivity. Otherwise, he would have found himself in the untenable
position of justifying the pricing restraint by its mitigating effect on an
arguably illegal territorial restraint. Justice Harlan avoided that diffi-
culty by agreeing with Justice Stewart's procedural analysis, 48 which as-
serted that the Court should be bound by the parties' "premise that the
respondent's granting of an exclusive territory to each distributor was a
perfectly permissible practice."' 4
9
This procedural analysis allowed Justice Harlan two degrees of free-
dom. First, he could moot the logic of competition, because his proce-
dural analysis represented the territorial restraint as a pre-existing
condition that made intrabrand competition impossible and thus irrele-
vant. Second, within the regime of common-law property rights, his as-
sumption of the restraint as a pre-existing condition allowed him to avoid
the fact that the territorial restraint represented an instance of Albrecht's
liberty already having given way.' 50 Given these convenient assump-
tions, Justice Harlan could argue that the Court should have privileged
the publisher's liberty of contract and enforced the agreement restricting
146. Id. at 152.
147. It should be noted that all of the Justices seemed to agree on one fundamental point-
that the public interest involved consumer well-being, rather than manufacturer or dealer well-
being. This is a shift from the Sherman Act debates' predominant focus on producer or dealer
interests. One way of viewing the modern discourse of vertical restraints is in terms of align-
ment with consumer interests: will the manufacturer or competing dealers best represent con-
sumer interests? Like the "free rider" rationale, this discourse of economic effects adjusts the
competition-property tension.
148. 390 U.S. at 156.
149. Id. at 168.
150. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40
March 1989] GENEALOGY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE 543
the dealer's liberty to set a price. That is, given exclusive territories and
thus the lack of competition, liberating Albrecht's right to set a price
would have no procompetitive effects. Rather, the Court should recog-
nize the agreement setting a price ceiling as a reasonable limitation of
monopoly power, not a restraint of competition.151 In short, Justice
Harlan argued that the Herald Company's setting of a maximum price
was a reasonable restraint of Albrecht's liberty because it served as a
proxy for competition in a distribution plan of exclusive territories. The
majority, however, refused to distinguish between setting minimum and
maximum prices, viewing both as restraints on the dealers' liberty of con-
tract.152 Moreover, the majority refused to characterize the territorial
restriction as a pre-existing condition beyond its scrutiny. Thus, it
viewed the individuation of property rights (that is, liberty) as the war-
rant for striking down both restraints of competition between dealers of
the Globe-Democrat.
With these sentiments in favor of "independent carriers" echoing
the Simpson opinion's Jeffersonian entrepreneurial defense of intrabrand
competition, Albrecht all but eliminated the Colgate doctrine as a viable
form of property logic. In contrast to the old literalist jurisprudence of
"full and free competition" among rivals, the modem Court's opinion is
driven by the desire to minimize the size of the entity holding individual
property rights in the distribution chain from producers to consumers.
Not only the Herald Company, but also Milne, Kroner, Albrecht, and
every other dealer held these rights. Each dealer's rights included the
individual liberty to dispose of its property. The logical (and often the
151. Justice Harlan offered two rationales for his view, both of which aligned the pub-
lisher's interest with that of the consumer. First, he made reference to the particular facts of
the Albrecht case, arguing that the price ceiling was a reasonable restraint of Albrecht's mo-
nopoly power, rather than a restraint of competition. 390 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 153 (White, J.) (citing Albrecht v. Herald Co., 367 F.2d 517, 524-25 (8th Cir.
1966)). Thus, there was no competition to be restrained. The Herald Company's setting of a
maximum price was a reasonable way of protecting consumers from the dealers' monopoly
power in their exclusive territories. Second, Justice Harlan made a theoretical argument
whose assumptions were in part inconsistent with the Albrecht facts. He claimed that, again,
the manufacturer's setting of a maximum price was in theory consistent with the consumer's
interest in paying less because the lower price not only would increase demand for its newspa-
pers but also would enhance competition with rival newspapers. Id. at 158-59. As the facts
suggest, this need not occur. When Albrecht's customers were given the opportunity to pay
less, approximately 75% did not shift. It may be that demand for The Globe-Democrat was
not price-sensitive. Moreover, there was no mention of rival newspapers. This suggests that
the Herald Company's price ceiling was an attempt to control distribution costs and appropri-
ate the entire monopoly profit. This view, approving of profit-maximizing conduct, is reminis-
cent of Justice Holmes' dissent in Dr. Miles. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
152. 390 U.S. at 152.
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practical) consequence of this proliferation of independent dealers was
thought to be intrabrand competition.
The notion of "agreement" constitutes a doctrinal mediation of the
tension between competition and property logics, in much the same way
that the common-law doctrine of consignment functioned before Simp-
son. In this regard, Albrecht is significant for two reasons. First, the
Court came dangerously close to annihilating individual property rights
of the publisher, while protecting those of the dealer. Once again, the
arbitrariness of defining property rights is seen, this time in the shifting
definition of "agreement" and by implication, in the shifting treatment of
producer's and dealer's rights. Why choose one party or the other? One
basis is the effect on competition, either intra- or interbrand. Another is
attention to individual liberty, itself a shifting concept. There are numer-
ous standards available to allocate these rights and numerous meta-stan-
dards for choosing among them. The notion of "agreement" creates
another vertical restraints doctrine that requires the Court to make arbi-
trary choices about the extent of competition logic's intrusion into an
underlying regime of individual property rights.
The case is significant for a second reason-the difference of opinion
over the relationship between individual liberty and competition.
Whereas the majority asserted that protecting the individual liberty of
dealers maximizes competition, Justice Harlan argued that a producer's
exercise of its liberty of contract (to restrain dealer liberty) can some-
times improve or even replace competition. The majority's view was im-
pelled by the belief that equalizing the distribution of property rights
benefitted the exercise of individual liberty. Like the old literalist juris-
prudence, the Court opinions in Simpson and Albrecht identified the
strength of their political economy with the class of "small dealers and
worthy men," whereas Justice Harlan and those who agreed with him
cast their lot with the class of large manufacturers.
E. Common-Law Property Rights and Interbrand Competition
Although the Court currently retains the view that resale price
maintenance is illegal per se, two recent cases signal a rhetorical return to
the pre-Simpson era of expansive property rights for producers. In the
first case, Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 153 although the
Court refused the Justice Department's invitation to reconsider the per se
illegality of resale price maintenance, it did give notice that the dealer's
153. 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984); see also 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341
(1987) (reaffirming that retail price maintenance "has been a per se violation of § 1 of the
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burden of proving an illegal price restraint would be greater. This notice
consisted of a lengthy discussion rehabilitating two discarded argu-
ments-the "free rider" rationale and the Colgate doctrine. 154 The sec-
ond case, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 155 has
had the effect of further shrinking the notion of a "price fixing agree-
ment," consequently increasing the freedom of producers to terminate
price-cutting dealers or distributors.
In both cases, price competition among dealers was seen as less im-
portant than the producer's liberty to dispose of its product as it chooses.
The Court viewed producers' choices of distribution plans as worthy of
protection because they were seen as strategies to enhance interbrand
competition. 156 This new linkage between producers' liberty of contract
and interbrand competition parallels the logic deployed in Simpson and
Albrecht-that protecting dealers' liberty to set a price enhances in-
tra brand competition.1 57 The difference lies in the allocation of the lib-
erty of contract right to dispose of one's property. Justice Holmes
observed in his Dr. Miles dissent that a commitment to liberty cannot
provide the logic for its allocation. 158 The remainder of this section ana-
lyzes the current Court's arguments for shifting these rights back to the
producer.
(1) Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
The Monsanto Company had terminated the dealership rights of
Spray-Rite, a family-owned "discount operation" and "10th largest of
approximately 100 distributors of Monsanto's primary corn herbi-
Sherman Act 'since the early days of national antitrust enforcement' " and citing Monsanto
and Dr. Miles).
Assistant Attorney General Baxter, in an amicus brief, asked the Court to reconsider the
per se standard. 465 U.S. at 753, 761 n.7.
154. The Court adopted the expanded property rhetoric of Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1977), written four years earlier, which itself revived the
rhetoric of White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), the first Supreme
Court opinion to operationalize a category of nonprice restraints. For an earlier opinion, see,
e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 822 (1957). In these cases, the Court did shift from a per se rule to a rule of reason
standard to evaluate manufacturers' rights to impose nonprice restraints on their dealers and
distributors. The Monsanto opinion adopts this new property logic. See inffra notes 253-88
and accompanying text for a discussion of the GTE Sylvania opinion.
155. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
156. The Court paid no heed to critics who argue that other strategies are equally effective
and less destructive of dealer competition. See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
158. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411-12 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
cide."1 59 Although the Monsanto Company argued that the termination
was due to Spray-Rite's failure to hire trained sales personnel who could
educate customers and thereby promote the product, the Court found
evidence sufficient to show that the termination was motivated by the
Monsanto Company's desire to maintain a resale price fixing
conspiracy. 
60
Writing for a united Court,16 ' Justice Powell addressed the only is-
sue on appeal-whether "proof of termination following competitor
complaints is sufficient to support an inference of concerted action."1
62
That is, was there adequate proof of a "price fixing agreement"? The
Court based its analysis of this issue on "two important distinctions that
are at the center of this and any other distributor-termination case": (1)
"concerted and independent action," and (2) "concerted action to set
prices and concerted action on nonprice restrictions."'' 63 Justice Powell
candidly observed that these distinctions "are often [d]ifficult to apply in
practice" because their "market impact ... [or] economic effect ... is in
many, but not all, cases similar or identical."'' 64 But when the competi-
tion rhetoric of "market impact" cannot differentiate among these forms
of "arguably anticompetitive conduct,"' 65 it is unclear why these doctri-
nal distinctions between concerted and unilateral action, and between
price and nonprice restraints are maintained.
Justice Powell gave no explicit rationale, simply stating that the dif-
ferences are important because "price-fixing agreements ... are subject
to per se treatment and treble damages" and nonprice restraints are
not. 166 Given the finding of a price fixing agreement, the Court held the
termination a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. A famil-
iar property logic appearing later in the opinion suggests the basis for this
fundamental distinction: "to permit the inference of concerted action on
the basis of receiving complaints alone ... would . . .inhibit manage-
159. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 756-57 (1984).
160. Id. at 765-66.
161. Justice Brennan wrote a one paragraph opinion concurring in the result and in the
Court's retention of the per se standard. Id. at 769. Justice White took no part in the case.
162. Id. at 758 (citing Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1238 (7th
Cir. 1982)).
163. Id. at 760-61. Justice Powell seemed to be referring to (1) the Colgate doctrine per-
mitting unilateral restraints and (2) the White Motor distinction between price and nonprice
restraints, discussed infra notes 200-24. There is a later reference to the "free rider" thread as
well. Id. at 763. For a discussion of the consignment thread's unraveling, see infra notes 253-
73 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 762.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 763.
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ment's exercise of its independent business judgment .... ,,167 In short,
to treat evidence of dealers' complaints about discounting as conclusive
proof of a price fixing agreement would interfere with the manufacturer's
liberty and property interests. The opinion made explicit its antecedents:
"Under Colgate, the manufacturer can announce its resale prices in ad-
vance and refuse to deal with those who fail to comply. And a distribu-
tor is free to acquiesce in the manufacturer's demand in order to avoid
termination."' 168 In impliedly overruling the Albrecht opinion's doctrine
of combination by acquiescence, the Court revived the Colgate doctrine's
bilateral notion of limiting individual liberty by requiring a "meeting of
the minds" or "a common scheme": "evidence must be presented both
that the distributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and
that this was sought by the manufacturer."1 69
In requiring some sort of bilateral communication, the Court would
seem to have returned to the Colgate opinion's view that a dealer is pre-
sumed to have retained its liberty to set a price unless it explicitly
promises to take the manufacturer's price. Yet, the Court did not return
to this view. The Court is no longer concerned with the dealer's liberty
or with the restraint's impact on dealer competition. Instead, its con-
stricted view of "agreement" enlarges the manufacturer's liberty of con-
tract right to restrain competition, for the explicit purpose of limiting
dealer liberty to set prices for its products. 170 This radical reversal in the
importance of dealer price competition rests upon the so-called "free
rider" rationale.
The "free rider" rationale is contained in the Monsanto opinion's
distinction between price and nonprice restraints on competition.' 7' As
section II, below, discusses in detail, this distinction is both elusive and
important. It is elusive not only because the competitive effects of both
kinds of restraints are often indistinguishable, but also because "manu-
facturers and distributors have legitimate reasons to exchange informa-
tion about the prices and the reception of their products in the
market."' 72 It is important because failure to make the distinction
"could deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct."' 173 The reference
to "legitimate conduct" is to "agreements on often costly nonprice re-
167. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105,
111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980)).
168. Id. at 761.
169. Id. at 764 n.9.
170. See supra notes 65-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Colgate doctrine.
171. 465 U.S. at 762-63.
172. Id. at 762.
173. Id. at 763.
strictions," such as presale promotion, inventory level requirements, or
sales staff training. "The manufacturer often will want to ensure that its
distributors earn sufficient profit to pay for [such] programs . . . . 174
This concern for "sufficient profit" echoes the property logic of "fair
profit" heard as early as the legislative debates preceding the Sherman
Act and the Dr. Miles Company's losing arguments. 175 The Monsanto
opinion permits manufacturers to enforce nonprice restraints on all deal-
ers to encourage their promotional activities, despite the indirect effect of
restraining price competition among dealers. Incentives to encourage
promotional activities, the Court believes, constitute a legitimate strategy
to enhance interbrand competition, even though there are less restrictive
strategies that make sense.
176
To protect the profits of full service dealers, the manufacturer "will
want to see that free riders do not interfere."' 177 The following is a quick
sketch of the "free rider" rationale-a two dimensional likeness in terms
of property and competition logics.178 First, a "free rider" is a discount-
ing retailer who engages in price competition, rather than in nonprice
marketing strategies. Price competition is anathema to dealers who en-
gage in promotional activities or provide service facilities, and to manu-
facturers who want them to provide such activities and facilities. There
is substantial controversy regarding the fairness of permitting manufac-
turers to terminate price cutters, because their elimination effectively im-
poses the costs of promotional activities on all consumers, whether they
prefer services or lower prices.
Second, a commitment to property logic has produced the pejorative
term "free rider," rather than the neutral term "price discounter," or the
ameliorative term "price competitor." As Judges Posner and Easter-
brook have told their readers: "When people use a valuable good without
paying for it, economists call them free riders."' 179 In other words, their
ethical concern with free riders is the taking of another's property. Tan-
tamount to theft, free riding involves the appropriation of a promoting
dealer's "fair profit." That fair profit is earned by the dealer's promo-
tional efforts on behalf of the manufacturer.
174. Id. at 762-63.
175. See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 297-303.
176. There are other ways to promote interbrand competition. See infra note 264 and
accompanying text.
177. 465 U.S. at 763 (citing Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977)).
178. I want to postpone until my discussion of nonprice restraints doctrine a full explica-
tion of the "free rider" rationale for restraining intrabrand competition.
179. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST LAW 177 (2d ed. 1984).
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(2) Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
Last term in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 180
the Court further increased its commitment to the "free rider" rationale
and diminished the role of "agreement" in vertical price restraints doc-
trine. Justice Scalia's opinion was so heavily invested in the free rider
rationale that facts tending to show its inapplicability were simply ig-
nored. Regarding the question of what now constitutes a price fixing
"agreement," it is clear that the opinion's narrow view will tend to throw
dealer terminations into the lawful category of "unilateral" conduct.
The facts of Sharp Electronics are as follows. Sharp Electronics au-
thorized two dealers-Hartwell and Business Electronics Corp. (BEC)-
to sell its calculators in the Houston area. Hartwell complained repeat-
edly about BEC's price cutting. Finally, Hartwell threatened to stop car-
rying Sharp products unless Sharp terminated BEC. Sharp agreed to
terminate BEC, and BEC then filed suit against both Sharp and Hart-
well, claiming that they had conspired to terminate BEC on account of
its price cutting. 18 1
In an analysis weakened by contradictions and errors, Justice Scalia
characterized the issue as locating the "proper dividing line between"
price and nonprice restraints.18 2 Early in the opinion, he identified the
doctrinal compass for finding that line: "Departure from the rule-of-rea-
son standard must be based on demonstrable economic effect rather than
... upon formalistic line drawing."' 83 Yet, later in the opinion, Justice
Scalia enforced the very formalism apparently renounced.
Justice Scalia took issue with Justice Stevens' argument in his dis-
senting opinion, that BEC's termination should be viewed as a horizontal
restraint (and thus illegal per se). Repeating Justice Hughes' well-known
reasoning in Dr. Miles, Justice Stevens' dissent based its view on the re-
straint's economic effects-it is "just like" a cartel or group boycott.'
8 4
Rather than disputing Justice Stevens' rendition of the horizontal effects,
Justice Scalia wrote: "A restraint is horizontal not because it has hori-
zontal effects, but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement."1 85
180. 108 S. Ct. 1515 (1988).
181. Id. at 1518.
182. Id. at 1517. Two obvious errors are, first, the characterization of the Standard Oil
case as representative of the earliest decisions of the Court, id. at 1519, and second, the accept-
ance of Mr. Bork's erroneous view of ancillary restraints, id. at 1522 n.3. For analyses of these
issues, see Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 314-24.
183. Id. at 1519 (citing Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59
(1977)).
184. Id. at 1530-32.
185. Id. at 1523 n.4.
Although this inconsistency between the majority's theory of economic
effects and its practice of formalistic line drawing might appear to be of
limited significance, it underscores a central flaw in Justice Scalia's analy-
sis. That flaw is a formalistic reliance on presumptions, in disregard of
facts inconsistent with the presumptions, and thus, in disregard of eco-
nomic effects.
In antitrust jurisprudence, such disregard of economic effects consti-
tutes a rule of per se (il)legality. Although Sharp Electronics' conduct
was adjudged a nonprice restraint, calling for a rule of reason analysis,'1
86
the implication of Justice Scalia's new formalism is a return to a policy of
vertical restraints as legal per se, recalling the General Electric era of
consignments as an unassailable method for imposing vertical restraints.
In Sharp Electronics, the most important example of this formalism
is an unmitigated reliance on the free rider rationale for protecting the
manufacturer's right to terminate a price cutter. The Court presumed
that discounting dealers are free riders1 87 who by their very nature ap-
propriate the value of other dealers' promotional activities, thereby dis-
rupting the best laid plans of manufacturers to improve their positions in
interbrand competition. The legality of such terminations is based on the
further presumption that privileging the manufacturer's rights to elimi-
nate these "market imperfections" gives them the control they need in
planning programs to succeed in interbrand competition.
But as Justice Stevens observed in his thoughtful dissent, BEC's ter-
mination was the result of Hartwell's ultimatum, not Sharp's restraints to
enhance interbrand competition. In fact, there were no vertical re-
straints. 188 Moreover, there was no evidence that Hartwell's higher
prices constituted a "fair profit" earned from promotional activities.
Rather, Hartwell simply wanted to eliminate a price cutter so that it
could charge higher prices. Nonetheless, the Court slavishly held to its
186. See infra notes 200-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of nonprice restraints.
It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia cites the overruled General Electric opinion. Id. at
1524. Is this the first indication of a revival of consignment rights?
187. Id. at 1523.
188. Id. at 1528-30. Justice Stevens also argued that the Court's analysis, based on the
distinction between price and nonprice restraints, was inappropriate because there was no ter-
ritorial or price restraint imposed. Neither category as traditionally composed had any de-
scriptive value in the case. Rather, the restraint should be analyzed according to the doctrine
of ancillary restraints, with particular attention to its horizontal effects. Id. at 1528-31. Ac-
cording to this analysis, the restraint was not ancillary to any agreement and thus was direct or
"naked." Moreover, the producer was not motivated by a desire to enhance interbrand com-
petition, but rather, was coerced by a dealer with market power. Finally, the termination
eliminated intrabrand competition in the Houston area. Given the termination's nature as a
direct restraint and its purely anticompetitive effects, the Court should find it illegal per se.
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free rider theory. Thus, it appears that BEC, as a discounter, was a free
rider per se-that is, regardless of the economic circumstances.
Justice Scalia's formalistic analysis has had the practical effects of
annihilating dealer property rights and burying dealer competition-it
perhaps has made dealer terminations legal per se. At first blush, this
seems to be an overstatement of the new formalism's effects since it has
not taken into account dealer terminations to enforce price restraints. As
both Monsanto and Sharp Electronics confirm, dealer terminations to en-
force price restraints remain illegal per se. Although price restraints still
fall under the per se rule, the Court has shrunk the category of price
restraints to the point of collapse. In shifting the doctrinal dividing line
between price and nonprice restraints, the Court in Sharp Electronics
found the following jury instructions to be an unacceptable statement of
resale price maintenance doctrine:
If you find that there was an agreement between Sharp and Hart-
well to terminate Business Electronics because of Business Electronics'
price cutting, you should answer yes to [the question whether Sharp
violated the Sherman Act].... If a dealer demands that a manufac-
turer terminate a price cutting dealer, and the manufacturer agrees to
do so, the agreement is illegal if the manufacturer's purpose is to elimi-
nate the price cutting.
18 9
The Court was not willing to treat proof of such facts as adequate evi-
dence of an agreement to restrain price competition, although such proof
met the Monsanto standard.1 90
According to Justice Scalia, something more must be proved to
throw the agreement into the imploding category of vertical price re-
straints. The terminated dealer also must offer convincing evidence that
the complaining dealer "express[ly] or implied[ly] agree[d] to set resale
prices at some level."' 91 Such evidence is necessary because, the Court
admitted, "all vertical restraints ... have the potential to allow dealers to
increase 'prices' and can be characterized as intended to achieve just
that."'192 Moreover, the Court's analysis assumed that the manufac-
turer's intent in imposing nonprice restraints is to "reduce intrabrand
189. Id. at 1518.
190. See supra notes 159-79 and accompanying text.
191. 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-25 (1988). The Circuit Court wrote that the complaining
dealer "retainfed] complete freedom to set whatever price it chooses." Id. at 1518 (citing Busi-
ness Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 780 F.2d 1212, 1218 (1988)). Justice Scalia presented
familiar reasons for extending the manufacturer's right to terminate a price cutting dealer,
including the free rider rationale. Other justifications included the presumption that no manu-
facturer cartel was plausible and that vertical integration, a presumedly likely and legal alter-
native, posed a greater threat. Id. at 1520-22.
192. Id. at 1521-22.
price competition . . . . 193 In short, the doctrinal distinction between
price and nonprice restraints makes no economic sense in terms of com-
petitive effects. It appears, then, that the doctrine's value was unrelated
to the logic of competition. Rather it provided a language for allocating
property rights between manufacturers and dealers, by designating some
restraints as price restraints and thus illegal per se, and others as non-
price restraints and de facto legal under the rule of reason. 194 By increas-
ing the terminated dealer's burden of proving a "price restraint," the
Court compressed the category of illegal restraints. In consequence, the
majority redistributed property rights from dealers to manufacturers, al-
lowing the manufacturer a free hand in restraining intrabrand
competition.
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion argued that the Court, by
shifting its focus to interbrand competition, ignored recent Supreme
Court precedent, which had treated intrabrand competition as important
for a number-of reasons.195 "Thus, although the majority neglects to
mention it, fostering intrabrand competition has been recognized as an
important goal of antitrust law . . ,,196 Not only can restraints of in-
trabrand competition hurt consumers, their cartel-like economic conse-
quences can also harm terminated dealers in the same way that boycotts
do. Echoing the call for industrial liberty heard throughout the history
of vertical restraints doctrine, Justice Stevens repeated: "Thus, a boycott
[or restraint] 'is not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one
merchant whose business is so small that his destruction makes little dif-
ference to the economy.' ,'197 Intrabrand competition is important be-
cause it supports a class of "small dealers and worthy men." "' The
protection of price competition from conspiratorial restraint is an object
of special solicitation under the antitrust laws. We cannot respect that
solicitude by closing our eyes to the effect upon price competition of the
removal from the market, by combination or conspiracy, of a class of
traders.' "198 Once held together by a logic of competition practiced by
193. Id.
194. I call nonprice restraints de facto legal for two reasons. First, Justice Scalia's new
formalism transforms a rule of reason standard into an illegality rule based on an unquestioned
presumption. Second, even with a bona fide rule of reason standard, the difficulty of proof and
tremendous cost of litigating such a case create practical obstacles so great that a plaintiff must
be willing to risk a heavy investment to prosecute a rule of reason case.
195. Id. at 1532 (citing Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57
(1977)).
196. Id. at 1533 n.14.
197. Id. at 1529 n.5 (citing Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213
(1959)).
198. Id. (citing United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966)).
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the old literalists and more recently by the Court that produced the
Simpson and Albrecht opinions, the values of intrabrand price competi-
tion, independent entrepreneurs, and consumer well-being have fallen
into disrepute.
The collapse of this vision of industrial liberty can be characterized
in terms of the doctrinal shifts from the Simpson and Albrecht opinions
to the recent Monsanto and Sharp Electronics opinions. First and fore-
most, a powerful attraction to the free rider rationale has transformed
the treatment of liberty and property rights. In the earlier cases, these
rights shifted between producers and dealers, both of whom were seen as
having legitimate claims to those rights. The current free rider rationale,
however, has justified not only a shift of these rights to the producer but
also a delegitimation of dealer claims to them. Discounters are no longer
viewed as price competitors but rather as the knaves portrayed in Justice
Holmes' dissenting opinion in Dr. Miles.199
How has antitrust policy come to the point of calling price competi-
tors thieves? Understanding the logic of "free riders" calls for an appre-
ciation of its doctrinal context. The logic first assumes a distinction
between intrabrand and interbrand competition. Without that distinc-
tion, the manufacturer's presumed intent to improve its competitive posi-
tion against its rivals makes no sense because competition is seen as
occurring at the dealer level. The free rider rationale assumes second
that interbrand competition is the important category of rivalry. Those
two assumptions, however, are not only controversial, but also of recent
vintage. The Dr. Miles Company's "fair profit to promoting dealers"
argument, for example, fell on deaf ears: Justice Hughes analyzed its
claim in common-law property terms. Third, the logic of "free riders"
assumes a distinction between price and nonprice restraints. Without it,
there would be no basis for differentiating between restraints. They all
would be treated identically. Indeed, for over fifty years, the Court sim-
ply talked about a generic category of vertical restraints.
In the ninety-eight year history of Supreme Court antitrust doctrine,
the categories of price and nonprice restraints and inter- and intrabrand
competition are relative newcomers. The categories are only twenty-five
years old, having first appeared around the time of Simpson and Albrecht.
Thus, they are not natural or logical categories, as they sometimes ap-
pear to be in the Court's recent opinions. Rather, they are products of
antitrust history. The decline of industrial liberty, the commitment that
once motivated the literalist, as well as the more recent Simpson and Al-
199. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 386 (1911).
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brecht opinions, accounts for the appearance of these two categories over
the last twenty-five years. Tracing the directions that nonprice restraints
doctrine has taken documents a shift from the individuation of property
rights that proliferated independent entrepreneurs, to a free rider ration-
ale that now endangers them.
How is it that the Court has come to protect the manufacturer's
liberty and property rights from the dealer's right to set a price? Is it a
preference for interbrand competition, or a political economic commit-
ment to the health of a class of large producers? Alternatively, does the
Court view the competitive process as private transactions free from gov-
ernmental intervention? The final section of this study explores these
alternative explanations for the Court's current position by giving an his-
torical account of the two doctrines underlying the free rider rationale:
price versus nonprice restraints and intra- versus interbrand competition.
Both doctrines, as well as the free rider rationale, are produced by and
seek to mediate the tension between competition policy and private prop-
erty rights.
II. Nonprice Restraints: Free Riders and Intrabrand
Competition
Although Dr. Miles held that resale price maintenance was illegal
per se, Justice Hughes (and everyone else) presumed that properly
drafted consignment contracts would allow a manufacturer to control
the disposition of its goods from production to consumption. Underlying
that presumption was the belief that competition was subordinate to
common-law consignment rights. The primacy of common-law consign-
ment rights also motivated the General Electric doctrine, which held
sway from 1927 through the Great Depression and the New Deal,
through the Eisenhower years of troops in Korea and the National
Guard in Little Rock, and into the Lyndon Johnson years. It remained
in force until 1964, when the Simpson opinion shook a cornerstone of
common-law property rights by elevating competition policy above a
fundamental property right (consignment) that had remained unchal-
lenged for a period that began before Lord Coke wrote Coke on Littleton.
In the last year of General Electric's consignment regime-one year
before Simpson-a new property rhetoric appeared to limit competition
policy, even in transactions that did not take the form of consign-
ments.2°° In White Motor Co. v. United States,20' the Court created a
separate category for nonprice restraints associated with straight sales
200. The fair trade laws then in force represented a legislative limitation of Dr. Miles: In
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transactions. For the first time, a rule of reason standard appeared in
vertical restraints doctrine. A nonprice restraint ancillary to a sales
transaction, such as a territorial or customer limitation, could be a rea-
sonable restraint of trade. Like the manufacturers in the cases preceding
White Motor, the White Motor Company imposed both price and non-
price restraints on its distributors and dealers. 20 2 Why then did this
Court, soon to write the Simpson opinion liberating gasoline service sta-
tion proprietors to compete with one another, deem a truck manufac-
turer's territorial and customer restraints on dealers deserving of special
protection under the rule of reason?
A triangular logic animated by an impulse toward equality led the
Court in White Motor to remove nonprice restraints from the rule of per
se illegality. What distinguished the White Motor Company from the
Union Oil Company in Simpson was White's smaller size and its weak
market position. Given these economic circumstances, the Court was
confronted with White Motor Company's argument to maintain in-
any states that had fair trade laws, the producer could lawfully impose vertical price restraints.
See Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3, at 301 n. 80.
201. 372 U.S. 253, 262-63 (1963). The White Motor Company manufactures trucks and
sells them (and parts) to dealers and to various large users. The government argued that the
following typical territory clause was illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Act:
[Dealer] is hereby granted the exclusive right ... to sell during the life of this agree-
ment, in the territory described below, White and Autocar trucks purchased from
Company hereunder ... [Dealer] agrees to develop the aforementioned territory to
the satisfaction of Company, and not to sell any trucks purchased hereunder except
in accordance with this agreement, and not to sell such trucks except to individuals,
firms, or corporations having a place of business and/or purchasing headquarters in
said territory.
Id. at 255-56.
White Motor Company argued that "the territorial clauses [were] necessary in order for
[it] to compete with those who make other competitory kinds of trucks .... " Id. at 256. For
the
system to be effective against the existing competition of the larger companies, a
[dealer] must make vigorous and intensive efforts in a restricted territory, and if he is
to be held responsible for energetic performance, it is fair, reasonable, and necessary
that [White Motor Company] protect him against invasions of his territory by other
... dealers. ...
Id.
The Court reversed the trial court's holding that White Motor Company's customer and
territorial restrictions on its dealers were illegal per se, remanding for further proceedings to
investigate the economic and business circumstances surrounding the restraints, in order to
determine whether a per se rule or a rule of reason standard should be applied. The case was
subsequently settled by consent decree. White Motor Co. v. United States, 1964 Trade Cases,
% 79,762 (N.D. Ohio). The Court's reversal and remand was taken to announce a rule of
reason standard for vertical nonprice restraints. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 339 F.2d 847, 849-50 (6th Cir. 1964).
202. 372 U.S. at 256-57; see, eg., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S.
707, 723 (1944).
dependent producers. The Court's new rule of reason standard for non-
price restraints evidenced a solicitude for the White Motor Company's
struggle to compete against the "Big Three" automakers-General Mo-
tors, Ford, and Chrysler. The logic supporting the Court's willingness to
protect White Motor Company's restraints has three parts: a free rider
rationale, a distinction between price and nonprice restraints, and a dis-
tinction between inter- and intrabrand competition. The logic is also tri-
angular in the sense that each part touches and supports the other two.
Removing any one side would collapse the entire structure, which func-
tions as a complex mediation of competition policy and common-law
property rights.
Each leg of the Court's logic was new. First, the free rider rationale
was different from Dr. Miles Company's argument in 1911 because it
included an impulse toward proliferating independent producers, as well
as the familiar "fair profit" for dealers. Second, the Court had not
treated the distinction between price and nonprice restraints as signifi-
cant before. Finally, to modern eyes, a nascent distinction between inter-
and intrabrand competition was already evident in the Dr. Miles case.
Although Justice Hughes for the Court recognized no such distinction
within the logic of competition, Justice Holmes' dissent applied a liberty
of contract rhetoric that called for the "competition of conflicting
desires"-that is, consumers shifting to substitute products when prices
get too high. 20 3 In today's typical markets, characterized by product dif-
ferentiation, this notion of shifting includes moves from, for example,
Coke to Pepsi, or from Ford to Chevrolet to Hyundai. It is fair to say
that Justice Holmes' view of legitimate competition could have included
what we today would call interbrand competition, though Justice
Holmes did not characterize it in these terms.
For Justice Holmes, however, allowing rivalry among dealers in Dr.
Miles patent medicine entailed interference with the right of "people [to]
manage their own business in their own way. ' ' 20 4 Later, both the Colgate
and General Electric doctrines would serve a similar commitment to pro-
tecting the producer's property rights. The right to restrict competition
in one's own goods has always been a major premise of the property
logics at work in vertical restraints doctrine. 20 5 The "free rider" ration-
203. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 411-12 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 411; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
205. The fundamental problem with this premise has been the arbitrariness of the process
of allocating property rights. See, e.g., supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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ale includes a form of this premise-the right to restrain others from
appropriating the value of one's promotional activities.
It was the White Motor opinion that finally adopted a free rider ra-
tionale as the basis for granting the manufacturer-here, an independent
producer-some rights to restrain competition in its products. The trial
court had granted the government's motion for summary judgment, im-
posing a rule of per se illegality on all vertical restraints. Appealing only
the motions regarding nonprice restraints, the White Motor Company
argued that its territorial and customer limitations were restrictions nec-
essary for it to compete effectively against large rivals in the truck manu-
facturing business-General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. As an
incentive "for energetic performance, it is fair, reasonable, and necessary
that appellant protect [the dealer] against invasions of his territory by
other distributors or dealers .... "206 Justice Clark in his dissent echoed
Justice Hughes' opinion for the Court in Dr. Miles, which refused to give
any weight to the manufacturer's position, then seen as a liberty-based
argument. Justice Clark characterized the independent producer's argu-
ment as nothing more than an attempt "to make a virtue of business
necessity, which has long been rejected as a defense. '20 7
Although the White Motor Company's distribution plan plainly re-
strained competition among dealers, the Court simply observed that the
restrictions' effects on competition were not sufficiently clear for a per se
rule.208 At the very least, it is clear that the Court no longer held to a
unitary logic of competition. If it had subscribed to that view of competi-
tion, a restraint of competition among dealers would have constituted
clear effects on competition. Now, however, there were two strains-
inter- and intrabrand competition-that could lead to different conclu-
sions about competitive effects. Justice Douglas wrote for this Court that
the restraint of one's distributors and dealers could be necessary to com-
pete with other manufacturers. But, as he would soon write in Simpson,
restraining dealers could also exacerbate an already uncompetitive manu-
facturer market. In short, a commitment to proliferating independent
entrepreneurs led the Court to consider the competitive state of markets
at both the dealer and manufacturer levels.
To describe the White Motor Company opinion's production of a
binary rhetoric of competition, the remainder of this section examines
the analyses of Justices Douglas for the majority, Brennan in concur-
206. 372 U.S. at 254-56.
207. Id. at 278 (citing Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373, 402-
03 (1911)).
208. Id. at 263.
rence, and Clark in dissent, of the Government's two major arguments
seeking to characterize the White Motor Company's nonprice restraints
as illegal per se. An investigation of these two arguments reveals the
following form of triangular logic, already introduced at the beginning of
this section. The first leg of the triangle was the free rider rationale. The
second was the distinction recognized between inter- and intrabrand
competition. The two legs created a new angle of analysis for the Court,
in the sense that a free rider rationale had no function without a binary
rhetoric of competition. In other words, if this Court imagined simple
competition, regardless of brand (as did the Dr. Miles Court), then each
dealer would compete with all other dealers, regardless of brand. Thus, a
manufacturer would be seen as competing with other manufacturers only
at the wholesale or dealer level and not at retail. Another way of describ-
ing the vortex of these two legs is to imagine a binary logic of competi-
tion without a recognized free rider rationale. In White Motor Company,
the rationale provided the analytical angle for drawing distinctions be-
tween inter- and intrabrand competition. Without the free rider angle,
the distinction would lose its purpose. Manufacturers would have no
reason to urge the Court to recognize two kinds of competition because
their rationale for terminating price-cutters would be unavailable. They
could not argue that restraining intrabrand competition benefits inter-
brand rivalry. In sum, these two legs of the Court's triangular logic can
be thought of as mutually constituted: each was necessary for the other's
viability.
But neither was sufficient for the other's viability. Each also sup-
ported and was supported by the third leg of the Court's triangular logic:
the distinction between price and nonprice restraints. Take for example,
this leg's vortex with the binary rhetoric of competition. If the Court
recognized no distinction between price and nonprice restraints, if all
vertical restraints were (il)legal per se, then again, the reason for distin-
guishing between inter- and intrabrand rivalry would be lost. If all verti-
cal restraints were (il)legal per se, then manufacturers would have no
reason to argue that nonprice restraints should be treated differently be-
cause of their positive effects on interbrand competition. Here too, these
two legs of the Court's triangular logic can be thought of as mutually
constituted.
This structure allowed the Court to adjust tensions between compe-
tition policy and common-law property rights at both dealer and manu-
facturer levels. But the structure's strength was also its weakness: it was
always in danger of collapse because it was produced by a series of judg-
ments about competition policy and property rights. Should the Court
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alter its judgment, deciding, for example, that all vertical restraints are
illegal per se,209 one leg of the structure would crumble. That is, the
distinction between price and nonprice restraints would lose its purpose
(because they all would be illegal). In consequence, the binary rhetoric
of competition and the free rider rationale would also lose their purposes:
regardless of their values (inter- or intrabrand, free rider or not), the ter-
mination and the underlying restraint would be illegal per se. The pro-
ducer could impose no vertical restraints, regardless of its desire to
enhance its competitive position.
The government's first argument took the form of the preceding ex-
ample. The Justice Department urged that the trial court's summary
judgment and thus its ruling of per se illegality as applied to nonprice
restraints was appropriate because these restraints could not be isolated
from the White Motor Company's price restraints, themselves illegal per
se. The majority responded that there was no evidence that the "price
fixing was 'an integral part of the whole distribution system.'"210 In
short, the government was required to show that the system was essen-
tially a price fixing system. Otherwise, the new category of nonprice re-
straints would not be illegal per se. The problem created was deciding
whether any particular restraint was a price restraint, because all vertical
restraints have effects on intrabrand price competition.211
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, treated the government's
argument as an "analogy to resale price maintenance," an analogy that
he rejected because "[w]hile territorial restrictions may indirectly have a
similar effect upon intra brand competition, the effect on interbrand com-
petition is not necessarily the same as that of resale price mainte-
nance."'212 The common thread running through both the majority's
opinion and Justice Brennan's concurrence was the limitation of compe-
tition logic at the dealer level to its central tenet of market pricing. In
other words, the White Motor Company's right to compose its own strat-
egies to survive against the Big Three automakers was limited by the
dealer's right to compete on price. Not only did price competition sur-
vive at the dealer level, but the dealer's right to dispose of its property
survived as Well.
209. The common-law property rights that could justify such a shift include, for example,
the logic that the manufacturer had retained title. Another possibility is seen in the Sharp
Electronics opinion's new formalism. See supra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
210. 372 U.S. at 260.
211. See supra notes 201-07 and accompanying text.
212. 372 U.S. at 268 (emphasis in original).
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In contrast to the majority and concurrence, Justice Clark's dissent
argued for a broader, unitary logic of competition. To Justice Clark, a
nonprice restraint's "intended and actual effect is the same as, if not even
more destructive than, a price-fixing agreement or any of its per se
counterparts."
21 3
In its second argument seeking to connect the White Motor Com-
pany's practices to earlier case law, the government asked the Court to
extend the per se illegality of "horizontal arrangements among competi-
tors to divide territory, to a vertical arrangement by one manufacturer
restricting the territory of his distributors or dealers. ' 214 As Justice
Clark observed, the government's argument tracked the Court's opinion
in Dr. Miles: "the existence of interbrand competition has never been a
justification for an explicit agreement to eliminate competition. ' 215
The majority, however, saw the case in a different light. The Court
observed that vertical restraints "may be allowable protections against
aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company
has for breaking into or staying in business. 2 16 This commitment to
proliferate independent entrepreneurs allowed the Court to recognize the
White Motor Company as an independent producer in need of special
solicitude. Given the doctrinal latitude created by the distinction be-
tween price and nonprice restraints, the Court could say: "This is the
first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and
we know too little of [its] actual impact .... ,,217 Clearly, the vertical
arrangement had the avowed purpose and uncontroverted effect of re-
straining intrabrand competition. 21 8 Thus, the only unknown impact of
this vertical arrangement was its effect on interbrand competition. The
Court went on to say, "Horizontal [restraints] ... are naked restraints of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition. A vertical territo-
rial limitation may or may not have that purpose or effect."
'219
213. Id. at 279 (emphasis added). Justice Clark argued that territorial restraints had more
severe anticompetitive effects because price restrictions are more easily breached and tougher
to enforce. Id. at 280.
214. Id. at 261 (emphasis in original). Note the property logic embedded in the phrase
"one manufacturer restricting his distributors." Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 278.
216. Id. at 263. The opinion makes reference to the failing company defense to an an-
timerger cause of action under section 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 263-64; cf United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371-72 n.46 (1963) (failing company defense might
have some larger contours as applied to bank mergers because of the great public impact).
217. 372 U.S. at 261 (emphasis in original).
218. Moreover, the Court did not limit the per se illegality of horizontal arrangements to
interbrand agreements; all horizontal agreements were presumed to have anticompetitive im-
pact. Id.
219. Id. at 263.
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Justice Brennan concurred in the value of such restraints: "Indeed,
the principal justification which the appellant offers for the use of these
limitations is that they foster a vigorous interbrand competition which
might otherwise be absent. Thus, in order to determine the lawfulness of
this form of restraint, it becomes necessary to assess the merit of this
[claim]. '220 Justice Brennan was also concerned that perhaps "the terri-
torial restraints were imposed upon unwilling distributors by the manu-
facturer to serve exclusively his own interests.1221 His opinion, however,
goes on to show precisely how such an arrangement always serves more
than the manufacturer's interest. It may be necessary "to subdivide his
sales territory in order to ensure that his product will be adequately ad-
vertised, promoted, and serviced. '222 This need may be even greater "in
the case of a manufacturer starting out in business or marketing a new
and risky product ... simply in order to acquire and retain outlets, to
guarantee his distributors some degree of territorial insulation as well as
exclusive franchises. '223 The explicit purpose of territorial insulation is
the promise of higher profits to attract distributors and dealers. The
higher profits are protected from "aggressive competitors"-usually dis-
counters who prefer to compete on price. From a promoting dealer's
perspective, they are free riders, that is, they are enjoying the benefit of
product promotion without contributing to its cost. Indeed, in every
marketing effort that calls for distributors or dealers to promote a prod-
uct, vertical restraints benefit manufacturers to the extent that they also
benefit promoting distributors-that is, to the extent that the restraints
protect the higher profits that encourage distributors and dealers to en-
gage in promotional activities, thereby increasing demand for the manu-
facturer's products.
In sum, the White Motor Company's free rider rationale led the
Court to reason that restraining intrabrand competition in a small com-
pany's product could enhance interbrand rivalry. It concluded that, in
the interest of protecting both independent producers and independent
dealers, White Motor Company should be permitted to protect the fair
profit of its dealers in exchange for their promotional efforts. In allowing
some dealer restraints, the Court would serve the goal of proliferating
competitors at both the dealer and producer levels. The establishment of
two categories of restraint created the possibility of treating some re-
straints differently from others. But it also created the problem of allo-
220. Id. at 268.
221. Id. at 267.
222. Id. at 269.
223. Id.
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cating property rights between dealers and producers. It seemed that
dealers should have the liberty to dispose of their goods and compete
with one another. After all, they bought the goods in sales transactions.
The White Motor Company did not retain title; the dealers did. Still, the
Court had to recognize some producer property rights to restrain dealer
competition. The division between price and nonprice restraints repre-
sents such an arbitrary allocation of property rights to the producer.
224
Now, the producer could restrain nonprice competition, but could not
directly stop dealers from exercising the fundamental property right of
setting a price. Thus, both producers and dealers retained some property
rights and some right to compete. But imprisoned in the category of
nonprice restraints was the free rider-that is, the (terminated) dealer
who wanted to compete on price.
A. Common-Law Consignment and Nonprice Restraints
One year after the Supreme Court created the possibility of reason-
able restraints ancillary to straight sales transactions, the Simpson Court
eliminated the General Electric doctrine's special treatment of restraints
ancillary to consignments, finding Union Oil Company's resale price
maintenance agreements illegal per se. 225 Had the Simpson opinion ren-
dered all restraints illegal per se, unless ancillary to a noncoercive con-
signment?226 Or did the White Motor opinion's special category of
nonprice restraints shield some dealer restrictions?
It was four years later that United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. 227 addressed these questions. The Court's analysis of the bicycle
manufacturer's nonprice restraints deployed the common-law rhetoric of
consignment, rather than the White Motor opinion's "free rider" ration-
ale, while retaining the distinctions between price and nonprice re-
straints, and between inter- and intrabrand competition. 228 In short, the
224. It is arbitrary in the sense that the converse is also seen as reasonable. See supra notes
58-62 and accompanying text.
225. Simpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964).
226. There was also the practical question of what consignments, if any, would be consid-
ered noncoercive.
227. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). For a bibliography of scholarly criticisms of the Schwinn opin-
ion, see Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13 (1977).
228. Three indications of this boundary shift appear in the text. First, despite White Mo-
tor's explicit instruction to judge nonprice restraints according to the rule of reason, Schwinn
did not appeal the trial court's per se standard. See 388 U.S. at 368; United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 343 (N.D. Ill. 1965). Apparently, the government, trial
judge, and Schwinn agreed that Simpson's logic of competition trumped the White Motor re-
moval of nonprice restraints from the per se category. One can only surmise here because the
trial court judge cited only one case in his 21-page opinion-United States v. Bausch & Lomb
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Schwinn opinion retained the triangular logic, but replaced the free rider
leg with consignment rights. Taking on the role of connecting inter- and
intrabrand competition, consignment rights logic has the virtue of sim-
plicity: legal doctrine about passage of title has been well settled for
many years. It is easy to decide who has the property rights to particular
goods, and thus, who has the liberty to control their disposition. In con-
sequence, the relationship between inter- and intrabrand competition is
simplified: a consignment transaction allows the producer to implement
strategies to improve its competitive position. A straight sales transac-
tion allows dealers to be free of (unreasonable) restraints. 229 Finally, the
producer and dealer are left to negotiate the form of the transaction.
Thus, such final deference to relative bargaining power could have the
effect of benefitting parties with already established market power. The
commitment to proliferating competitors would require special attention
to the market power of the party imposing the restraint.
230
Schwinn's distribution scheme involved both consignment and sales
transactions with its bicycle distributors and dealers, who were not re-
stricted to handling only Schwinn products. The 22 distributors, over
5000 specialty bicycle shops, and B.F. Goodrich stores who handled
Schwinn bicycles were franchised subject to various territorial, customer,
and location restrictions. In the 10-year period following Schwinn's in-
stitution of its plan, its market share fell from 22.5 percent to 12.8 per-
cent. At the same time, however, its unit and dollar sales increased
substantially. 231 Unlike the Court's view of White Motor Company, this
Court seemed to view Schwinn neither as a newcomer nor as a failing
company.232
Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944)-for the proposition that proof of price fixing renders the
entire conspiracy illegal per se. 237 F. Supp. at 329. Second, although there was no claim that
Schwinn's consignments were "coercive," as described in Simpson, everyone agreed that those
restraints should be judged by the rule of reason; General Electric's per se legality position,
based on the title logic of consignment, was abandoned. Third, the government argued that
the restraints accompanying consignments were unreasonable simply because of their in-
tra brand effects, even though White Motor clearly subordinated the importance of such effects
to interbrand effects. 388 U.S. at 369; see White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
260-61 (1963). The free rider rationale appeared only in Justice Stewart's opinion, concurring
in part and dissenting in part. 388 U.S. at 383-84.
229. This Article's bias throughout is that a rule of reason standard is tantamount, in
practical terms, to legality.
230. For a discussion of Justice Stewart's argument to return to the White Motor opinion's
analysis, see infra notes 237-40 and accompanying text.
231. 388 U.S. at 368-72. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. fair traded where permitted by state
statute.
232. Id. at 374.
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The government argued that the trial court's application of a rule of
reason to Schwinn's customer limitations in sales transactions was erro-
neous in light of the per se standard applied to corresponding territorial
limitations. 23 3 The Court was urged to apply the per se standard to both
nonprice restraints because both "are in the nature of restraints upon
alienation which are beyond the power of the manufacturer to impose
upon its vendees. ' ' 234 Citing Dr. Miles as authority, the Court wasted
little time agreeing that "the decree should be revised to enjoin any limi-
tation upon the freedom of distributors [and retailers] to dispose of the
Schwinn products, which they have bought from Schwinn, where and to
whomever they choose. ' 235 Thus, where Schwinn had passed title by
sale and could not assert the property logic of agency or consignment,
nonprice restraints were illegal per se, even though there was no "finding
that the restrictions were part of a scheme involving unlawful price
fixing."
236
The Court's replacement of White Motor's free rider rationale with
the common-law property logic of consignment also changed the rela-
tionship between price and nonprice restraints. The free rider rationale
created a logical space between price and nonprice restraints. There was
room for two categories of restraints, and thus for the possibility of al-
lowing some restraints and proscribing others. In contrast, the logic of
233. The government also argued that the Court should reverse the trial court's finding
that Schwinn's restraints ancillary to consignments were reasonable. Richard Posner, appear-
ing for the government, argued that these customer and territorial limitations were unreasona-
ble restraints of trade because of their impact on intrabrand competition. Id. at 375.
Consistent with the White Motor and Simpson cases' view of intrabrand competition as
subordinate to interbrand rivalry, the Schwinn Court refused to consider the effects on in-
trabrand competition, observing that there was adequate competition with other brands of
bicycles, not only because of the availability of reasonably interchangeable substitutes, but also
because of the dealers' and distributors' handling of such substitutes. Id. at 383-84.
Apparently, the government thought that the Court would deem the Arnold, Schwinn's
12.8% market share large enough to distinguish it from the White Motor opinion's Jeffersonian
overtones. Though this was a plausible argument to make, given contemporaneous merger
cases like United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (post-merger market share
of 7.5% of the retail grocery business in the Los Angeles area), the lower court opinion itself
was filled with such Jeffersonian sentiments in Arnold, Schwinn's favor. See, e.g., United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 334 (N.D. 111. 1965) ("And penalized for
what? Being a pygmy, compared to its giant bicycle competitors, Sears, Roebuck & Co. and
Montgomery Ward & Co.? ... David and Goliath ... pygmy pitted against a Cyclops ... a
microscopic Lilliputian .... ").
234. 388 U.S. at 377. The government also argued that different treatment would be "il-
logical and inconsistent." Id. But Justice Stewart, dissenting, argued that the territorial re-
straint was really horizontal and therefore illegal per se. Id. at 389-91. There is nothing in the
trial court opinion to substantiate this view.
235. Id. at 378.
236. Id. at 373.
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consignment, already established for centuries, provided a well-worn
(formalistic) path between legal and illegal restraints: regardless of cate-
gory, all restraints ancillary to straight sales were illegal per se.
Justice Stewart, dissenting vehemently, argued at length against the
Court's "new per se rule. '237 "No previous antitrust decision of this
Court justifies its action. Instead, it completely repudiates the only case
in point, White Motor. '238 Justice Stewart "cannot understand how
[Schwinn's] marketing system becomes per se unreasonable and illegal in
those instances where it is effectuated through sales. ' 239 He was "com-
pletely at a loss to fathom how the Court can adopt its per se rule" re-
garding sales and "yet uphold identical restrictions... when distribution
takes the form of consignment" because there is no demonstration "that
these restrictions are in their actual operation somehow more
anticompetitive." 24°
Justice Stewart was absolutely correct; there was no demonstrated
difference in competitive impact. Rather, it was the common-law prop-
erty right of consignment that animated the majority's distinction. Jus-
tice Stewart dismissed this distinction as a "barren formalism." "Our
choice must be made on the basis not of abstractions but of the realities
of modern industrial life."'241 Regarding the "ancient rule against re-
straints on alienation," Justice Stewart remarked that "it is hardly the
practice of this Court to embrace a rule of law merely on grounds of its
antiquity. ' 242 He then offered two property logics of his own, both
favoring the manufacturer's "legitimate interest in ... his products once
he [has] sold them. '243 First, "the common-law doctrine of restraints on
alienation is not nearly so rigid." 24 "[O]nly unreasonable restraints
should be proscribed, and ... partial restrictions could be justified when
ancillary to a legitimate business purpose and not unduly anticompetitive
in effect."' 245 In short, the manufacturer is justified in projecting control
over property, even though title has passed. Second, the assumption that
"a manufacturer had no legitimate interest in what happened to his prod-
ucts once he had sold them to a middleman ... no longer holds true in a
237. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 388-89 (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
241. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320 (1949) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting)).
242. Id. at 391.
243. Id. at 392.
244. Id. at 391.
245. Id. at 391-92 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898)).
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day of sophisticated marketing policies, mass advertising, and vertically
integrated manufacturer-distributors. ' 246 It is "inappropriate for the
Court to base its overthrow of contemporary commercial policies on ju-
dicial views of the reign of Queen Elizabeth," particularly because "these
arrangements may operate identically in terms of economic function and
competitive effect."
'247
Thus, according to Justice Stewart, the "realities of modern indus-
trial life" require the manufacturer to have more extensive powers than
the common-law doctrine of consignment permits. It was not only the
identity of "competitive impact"-from nonprice (sales) restraints and
from nonprice (consignment) restraints-that motivated this call for
equal treatment. In theory, equal treatment of restraints on competition,
particularly on intrabrand competition among dealers of a successful na-
tional concern such as Schwinn, could call for a unitary rule of per se
illegality. But here, Justice Stewart argued for a unitary rule of reason
standard. In much the same way as the Court in White Motor viewed
the truck manufacturer as a struggling independent among the Big
Three, 248 Justice Stewart characterized the Schwinn Company as
"hop[ing] to meet the competition of the giant chain distributors.
'249
Moreover, the opinion made much of the bicycle producer's plan to
sell only to "small independent bicycle shops," rather than mass distribu-
tors.250 In seeking to justify the Schwinn Company's franchising policy,
Justice Stewart urged the Court to look beyond the facts of the particular
case:
The franchise method of operation has the advantage, from the stand-
point of our American system of competitive economy, of enabling nu-
merous groups of individuals with small capital to become
entrepreneurs .... If our economy had not developed that system of
operation these individuals would have turned out to have been merely
employees. The franchise system creates a class of independent
businessmen.
251
The majority was not swayed by this commitment to proliferate
dealers, perhaps because the Schwinn Company was viewed as a large
246. Id. at 392.
247. Id. at 392-93 (citations omitted).
248. Id. at 386, 387.
249. Id. at 384.
250. Id. at 383. While Schwinn's market share was cut in half (from 22.5% to 12.8%), its
dollar and unit sales increased substantially. It should be noted that Schwinn's major domestic
competitor, Murray, marketed through large chain distributors and increased its market share
from 11.6% to 22.8%.
251. Id. at 386-87 (citing Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. (1962)).
But, of course, it is antitrust policy regarding dealer terminations that has a great deal to say
about how much independence these entrepreneurs enjoy.
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successful firm, or perhaps because the formalism of the common-law
logic of consignment did not create a logical space for making the dis-
criminations necessary to empower a commitment to proliferate deal-
ers.252 Without the free rider rationale, the Court's triangular logic
collapsed, leaving unitary notions of competition and vertical restraints,
whose unitary rule was illegality per se, unless trumped by the traditional
property logic of consignment and agency.
B. Free Riders and Independent Producers
The Schwinn case's restoration of common-law consignment rights
was "the subject of continuing controversy and confusion" for a decade,
until Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 253 overruled the per se
illegality standard for all nonprice restraints accompanying straight sales
transactions. Characterizing the Schwinn opinion as "announcing its
sweeping per se rule . . . with no explanation of its sudden change in
position," Justice Powell writing for the majority in Sylvania, concluded
that "the appropriate decision is to return to the rule of reason that gov-
erned vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn.' ' 254 It was the White Motor
decision that introduced the rule of reason to vertical restraints doctrine,
based on a triangular logic of free riders, interbrand competition, and
nonprice restraints. Schwinn then collapsed the rule of reason analysis
into a question of common-law consignment rights whose property logic
gave clear (formalistic) direction to the allocation of freedom to dispose
of property and to the extent of competition at both producer and dealer
levels. The Sylvania decision restored the earlier triangular logic by re-
placing the consignment leg with the free rider rationale first deployed in
White Motor.255 Consequently, the issues of interbrand competition and
nonprice restraints regained analytical importance.
252. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text.
253. 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977).
254. Id. at 51, 59 (emphasis added).
255. The Sylvania Court simply treated nonprice restraints as an unquestioned category
whose only precedents were the paradigmatic White Motor opinion and the anomalous
Schwinn case. Id. at 49-51. Justice Powell's opinion for the Court echoes Justice Stewart's
dissent in Schwinn. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting). But the White Motor regime had governed for a very short time. For
those who, like Justice Powell writing for the Court, take White Motor as the only legitimate
precedent in the category of nonprice restraints, reason ruled for a term of four years. But this
view, most sympathetic to the rule of reason, ignores two intervening cases that undoubtedly
changed the contours of vertical restraints doctrine-the two resale price maintenance cases,
Simpson and Albrecht, the second case involving not only price but also nonprice restraints.
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153-54 (1968). Both opinions imposed a regime of
competition, whose per se standard left no room for the narrow logic of consignment, much
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Like the White Motor Company (and unlike Schwinn), GTE Sylva-
nia was a relatively small and struggling company. By the time it insti-
tuted a new distribution plan "in the hope of attracting the more
aggressive and competent retailers," it had seen a "decline in its market
share to a relatively insignificant 1% to 2% of national [television]
sales."' 256 Justice Powell could have distinguished the Schwinn case on a
number of grounds, including The Schwinn Company's strong market
position.257 Instead, he chose to challenge directly the Schwinn opinion's
rationale for categorizing a vertical restraint as illegal per se or subject to
the rule of reason-"the pivotal factor was the passage of title. '258 Jus-
tice Powell viewed this distinction as unfounded, declaring that the
"opinion provides no analytical support for these contrasting posi-
tions. ' 259 Limiting his notion of "analytical support" to the logic of
competition, Justice Powell concluded: "Nor is there even an assertion in
the opinion that the competitive impact of vertical restrictions is signifi-
cantly affected by the form of the transaction. '260  Justice Powell was
right; but he was also wrong. He was right that competition logic did not
less the expansive liberty-property logic of White Motor. If the Simpson and Albrecht cases are
factored into the analysis, then the rule of reason held sway for one year.
Justice Powell's treatment is problematic not only because intervening cases are not ac-
counted for, but also because the very distinction between price and nonprice restraints is
controversial. As Justice White observed in his insightful concurring opinion, "I suspect this
purported distinction may be as difficult to justify as that of Schwinn under the terms of the
majority's analysis." 433 U.S. at 70 (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 298 (1975)).
256. 433 U.S. at 38. The distribution plan was instituted in 1962. By 1965, market share
increased to 5%. Id.
257. Justice Fortas wrote that the Schwinn Company did not fall under the White Motor
case because there was no evidence of "possible factors relevant to a showing that the chal-
lenged vertical restraint is sheltered by the rule of reason because it is not anti-competitive."
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 374 (1967). The consignment logic
that followed, however, belied any concern for competitive impact. Justice Powell wrote:
"Although Schwinn did hint at preferential treatment for new entrants and failing firms, the
District Court below did not even submit Sylvania's claim that it was failing to the jury." 433
U.S. at 46-47 n.12.
258. 433 U.S. at 52.
259. Id. at 54.
260. Id. Justice Powell's claim of no "analytical support" for Schwinn's distinction be-
tween consignment and sale transactions brings to mind the old warning about living in glass
houses. For arguments that Justice Powell's distinction between price and nonprice restraints
has no analytical support, see Justice White's concurring opinion, 433 U.S. at 69, and sources
cited therein, and Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec.,
108 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-23 (1988). Notwithstanding Justice Powell's claim, there is, as I have
shown, "analytical support," but it is not competition logic. Rather, it is a common-law logic
for allocating property rights, calcified over the last few centuries, but certainly logical: who-
ever has title wins.
[Vol. 40
March 1989] GENEALOGY OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE 569
produce the distinction. He was wrong, however, that no logic sup-
ported the distinction between sales and consignment transactions. In a
footnote, Justice Powell observed that in Schwinn, the Court "stated that
to impose vertical restrictions in sale transactions would violate the an-
cient rule against restraints on alienation. ' 261 The footnote characterizes
this rule as unreasonable, by pointing out that "most commentators...
have regarded the Court's apparent reliance on the ancient rule as both a
misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis.
262
As this Article has shown, however, the "ancient rule" is only one
example, though the most long-lived, of a regime of property rights that
has been just as important as competition logic to the production of anti-
trust doctrine and analysis. In the history of vertical restraints doctrine,
the Schwinn opinion represents but one more instance in a long series of
struggles between logics associated with competition policy and property
rights, and struggles to adjust the tensions between them. It was Justice
White, concurring in Sylvania, who sensed the importance of property
logics to antitrust doctrine: "as Judge Browning argued in dissent below,
the notion in many of our cases involving vertical restraints [is] that in-
dependent businessmen should have the freedom to dispose of the goods
they own as they see fit."' 263 Justice White then wrote:
But while according some weight to the businessman's interest in
controlling the terms on which he trades in his own goods may be
anathema to those who view the Sherman Act as directed solely to
economic efficiency, this principle is without question more deeply em-
bedded in our cases than the notions of free rider and distributional
efficiencies borrowed by the majority from the new economics of verti-
cal relationships. 2
64
Having excluded the logic of common-law property rights (consign-
ment) from the realm of legitimate analysis, the Court could then claim
261. 433 U.S. at 53 n.21.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 67.
264. Id. at 68-69. There are two significant limitations in Justice White's view, though it
clearly allows for a better reading of vertical restraints doctrine than the Court's position.
First, the view is unable to distinguish between different forms of property logic. For example,
if the transaction is a sale and not a consignment, then the manufacturer and dealer have
countervailing liberty/property interests. Thus, they can negate one another, leaving an un-
contested competition logic to produce doctrine. That is the dynamic in Simpson. And even
when the liberty/property interest is portrayed as unitary, the configuration is volatile; its
instability can allow the logic's benefit to shift to the dealer as in Dr. Miles, or to the manufac-
turer as in White Motor. But if the manufacturer retains title, then there is a distinctive and
stable property logic on call to restrain competition. That is the Schwinn position. Second,
Justice White's view fails to see the relation between the Court's free rider logic, his view, and
the overthrown consignment rubric. As this Article demonstrates, they are all products of the
social forces of property logic.
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that vertical restraints on competition are reasonable only insofar as they
"promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to
achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products. ' 265 The
authority for this claim was the unsubstantiated assertion that "these 're-
deeming virtues' are implicit in every decision sustaining vertical restric-
tions under the rule of reason. ' 266 But as Justice White correctly
observed in his concurring opinion, there are other implications more
deeply embedded in vertical restraints doctrine than distributional effi-
ciencies. 267 In fact, the Court had adopted a free rider rationale only
fourteen years earlier, in White Motor. Prior to that time, vertical re-
straints were seen as having "redeeming virtues" more typically charac-
terized in terms maligned by this Court-virtues traditionally associated
with the common-law property rights of consignments.
Justice Powell next recounted the ways in which "manufacturers
can use such restrictions to compete more effectively against other manu-
facturers. '268 One way to compete more effectively is to employ vertical
restraints, such as territorial limitations, in order "to induce retailers to
engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities
necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. ' 269 That is, verti-
cal restraints protect promoting or servicing dealers by keeping their cus-
tomers from other dealers. These restraints benefit the manufacturer
because promotional activities and services "affect a manufacturer's
goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. ' 27 0 But "these services
might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive situation."' 27
Why? "Because of market imperfections such as the so-called free rider
effect."' 27 2 Based on the (economically irrational) category of nonprice
restraints and its presumed impact on interbrand competition, the Court
found it to be (economically) rational for manufacturers to restrain free
riders.
Who are these free riders? They are dealers or distributors who do
not promote the manufacturer's product. Instead, they prefer to com-
pete on price. Are they "market imperfections" or price competitors?
265. Id. at 54. There is no explanation of why the product is "his" rather than the
dealer's. This turning of the liberty/property premise to the manufacturer's benefit is an exam-
ple of the logic's volatility. See supra note 264.
266. Id.
267. See supra note 264.
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Given the Court's triangular logic of free riders, interbrand competition,
and nonprice restraints, discounting prices can be characterized as inter-
fering with strategies designed to improve a producer's competitive posi-
tion vis-A-vis other producers. Worse than that, price cutters
misappropriate the value of such strategies.
But other views of price-cutting are possible. As Professor Pitofsky
has pointedly shown, there are effective means other than vertical re-
straints to improve the efficiency of distribution and sales networks.
273
One solution to the problem of free riders involves provisions in
sales agreements (or separate agreements) promising to pay dealers to
engage in promotional servicing activities. With such pay-as-you-pro-
mote provisions, no dealers could free ride, because each promoting or
servicing dealer would be compensated directly for promotional activi-
ties.274 Such unrestrained competition between dealers would benefit the
consumer by lowering prices. The increased demand for the product at
lower prices would also benefit the manufacturer, whose demand func-
tion derives from demand at the retail level.275 Finally, it would make
economic sense for dealers to engage in promotional or servicing activi-
ties that are paid for by the producer. Dealers who do not take the offer
would be less competitive, for two reasons. First, they would have no
cost advantage to compete in price, because promoting dealers would not
bear the costs of promotion.27 6 Second, they would suffer a disadvantage
in nonprice competition. In this scenario, price cutters could not "ride
free." Their success at competing on price would then depend on their
greater efficiency, not on a (so-called) misappropriation of the benefit of
others' promotional and servicing activities. Under a rule of reason stan-
dard, manufacturers could be allocated the burden of proving that a
practice was a reasonable restraint of trade. In arguing for the reasona-
bleness of a restraint of intrabrand competition and the termination of
273. Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEo. L.J. 1487, 1494 (1983); see Peritz, Rule of Reason, supra note 3,
at 289 n. 22 and sources cited therein.
274. Immediate, direct payments might offer a better incentive than the possibility of more
customers. Also, supervision problems could be mitigated, in the sense that it may be more
efficient and less disruptive to discontinue one nonexclusive dealer's promotion payments than
to embark on a program of taking away and reassigning exclusive territories.
275. There might be situations in which the pay-as-you-promote alternative is more costly
to the manufacturer, thereby raising the cost to the dealer and thus to the consumer. How-
ever, the manufacturer would not be paying unless the dealer promoted. That makes relative
cost an empirical question whose investigation would enter into a rule of reason analysis. Or
we could simply make a judgment that the higher costs are justified by the improvement in the"
competitive process.
276. The advantage, if any, would go to more efficient promoters.
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uncooperative dealers, manufacturers would have a severely diminished
free rider rationale to justify the restraint. They would have to convince
a court that the territorial, customer, or price restraint imposed was a
less restrictive alternative than a pay-as-you-promote provision. They
would have to argue that such a provision was, under a rule of reason
standard, more anticompetitive than a vertical restraint. Indeed, courts
should require such showings in cases currently before them.
The recent White Motor and Sylvania decisions have affirmed the
traditional principle for evaluating a producer's restraint of dealers or
distributors. That principle is a solicitude for "a class of independent
businessman. ' 277 Justice Powell's opinion for the Court applied this
principle to critique the Schwinn decision's logic of consignment: be-
cause large firms are more likely to be able to afford consignment trans-
actions, the social policy implications are "inconsistent with [the Court's]
articulated concern for the ability of smaller firms to compete effectively
with larger ones." '2 78 Justice White, concurring in the judgment, used
the same principle in an attempt to reconcile the Schwinn decision with
his earlier opinion for the Court in White Motor: "The Court need only
hold that a location clause imposed by a manufacturer with negligible
economic power ... has a competitive impact sufficiently less restrictive
that the Schwinn restraint to justify a rule of reason standard. '279
The principle for allocating property rights (and thereby adjusting
the balance between inter- and intrabrand competition) raises the difficult
issue of defining "smaller firms" or "negligible economic power." Justice
Powell was uncomfortable with what he saw as a narrow definition:
"The advantages of vertical restrictions should not be limited to the cate-
gories of new entrants and failing firms. Sylvania was faltering, if not
failing, and we think it would be unduly artificial to deny it the use of
valuable competitive tools."' 280 Can a faltering firm have more than Syl-
vania's "insignificant 1% or 2%" share of a market? The Court would
have to face these questions about market share28' unless it extended to
277. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1967) (Stew-
ard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and sources cited therein.
278. 433 U.S. at 56.
279. Id. at 71.
280. Id. at 58 n.29. This sort of analysis is already part of antitrust doctrine in other areas.
See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 n.46 (1983) (failing company
defense in merger law); United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiarn, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (special treatment for newcomers to an industry).
281. That, of course, does not mean that a rule of reason standard is called for. The Court
has already articulated a shifting burden of proof methodology in horizontal merger cases. See
Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. at 363. There is also a "mini-rule of reason" introduced to
horizontal price fixing doctrine. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441
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all producers, regardless of their market share, the property right to re-
strain dealers. In that instance, any producer, simply by imposing a ver-
tical restraint, would qualify as a "faltering firm." No vertical restraints
would violate such a rule of reason analysis under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.
Justice Powell continued by setting the ground rules for a section 1
analysis: "Interbrand competition... is the primary concern of antitrust
law."128 2 No authority was cited for this proposition, perhaps because it
was seen as self-evident. But given the unitary logic of competition that
produced vertical restraints doctrine until the White Motor decision, Jus-
tice Powell's assertion is at the very least ahistorical, if not controversial.
Still, as the Court itself recognized, even if interbrand competition is the
primary concern, it has never been the only concern. The benefit of a
restraint at the manufacturer level must outweigh the harm at the dealer
level. 28 3 At that point, Justice Powell's analysis took a curious turn in
noting that "the degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent
of the level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer.
'284
This statement makes little sense because, as the Simpson case illustrates,
neither that proposition nor its converse is always true. 28 5 Instead, in-
trabrand and interbrand competition are more often intimately related.
If they were wholly independent, then the manufacturer's only motiva-
tion for vertical restraints would be to limit dealer rivalry. The Court
could attribute to GTE Sylvania no other reason for wanting to restrain
intrabrand competition. Indeed, the Court could not have embraced the
Sylvania opinion's free rider rationale, which asserted that such restraints
increase interbrand competition.28 6 The rationale was founded on a be-
lief in direct connections between intra- and interbrand competition. A
producer's restraint of dealer competition was seen as having a direct
impact on its prospects in rivalry with other producers.
If the Court took seriously its statement about the independence of
the two levels of competition, it would have to abandon the triangular
logic it had just restored. The free rider rationale would no longer call
for an analysis of the relationship between the two levels of competi-
tion-they would be seen as functionally unrelated to one another. If
U.S. 1, 24 (1979). In considering BMI's creation of a new product to be part of the rationale
for a "mini-rule of reason" analysis of horizontal price fixing, it appears that property senti-
ments akin to the General Electric opinion's consignment logic are emerging. Id. at 21-22.
282. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
283. Id. at 57 n.27.
284. Id. at 52 n.19.
285. See supra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
286. See, eg., 433 U.S. at 54.
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priority were ascribed to interbrand competition, the free rider rationale
would collapse into a property logic of "fair price" to dealers or misap-
propriation of good will, annihilating the level of intrabrand competition.
Although this reading of Justice Powell's opinion might appear to be no
more than a farfetched theoretical possibility, it is a reality. It represents
the position taken last term in Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in
Sharp Electronics.287 First of all, Justice Scalia did not concern himself
with the question of market power-either at the producer level or at the
dealer level. Thus, the Court lost track of the traditional preference for
independent entrepreneurs that had been expressed in the Sylvania opin-
ion, which the Court cited so extensively in Sharp Electronics. Second,
the opinion simply presumed that a price cutter is a free rider and thus,
that its termination is justified. As Justice Stevens implied in his dissent-
ing opinion,288 the Court's formalization of the free rider rationale had
the effect of excluding the traditional antitrust policies associated with
intrabrand competition. Finally, the formalized free rider rationale can-
not mediate between competition policy and property rights. Like the
common-law logic of consignment, the formalized "free rider" is simple:
the property rights to dispose of property have been allocated to the pro-
ducer, except for those contracts that fall into the microscopic category
of price restraints. Because they have virtually no property rights, deal-
ers cannot compete.
When this allocation of property rights is viewed within the context
of Justice Scalia's lack of concern for market power, it appears that the
only difference between the current regime and the General Electric era is
that today's producer need not go to the expense of a consignment plan.
All nonprice restraints of dealers and distributors are de facto legal. In
structural terms, there is the danger that the ongoing tension between
competition policy and property rights will dissipate. Competition
would mean "whatever a producer decided to do," short of entering a
cartel. Unless the Court in later opinions reconsiders its current under-
standing of Sylvania and the free rider rationale, a century of commit-
ments to maintaining a class of independent entrepreneurs and to
protecting consumer well-being through "full and free competition" will
survive only in the microscopic category of vertical price restraints.
287. See supra notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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Conclusion
This study ends with four concluding remarks. First, it is clear that
the traditional competition paradigm for antitrust law excludes half of
vertical restraints doctrine between 1911 and 1988. That is why the cur-
rent view makes no sense. This study demonstrates that a fundamental
tension between the conflicting logics of competition and property has
produced vertical restraints doctrine since the Dr. Miles case. Each argu-
ment of counsel and opinion of the Court represents a momentary battle
and temporary truce in the ongoing tensions between these rival logics.
A series of these battles and truces produced the doctrines regulating
producers' restraints of distributors and dealers. In short, the genealogy
of modem vertical restraints doctrine can no longer be mistaken for a
progressive history of the synthesis of competition and antitrust doctrine.
Second, current vertical restraints doctrine is largely the product of
property logics in restraint of competition. Over the years, the right to a
"fair profit," consignment rights, the freedom to dispose of one's goods
and services, and the free rider rationale for terminating price cutters are
all historical instances of property logic in restraint of competition. The
extreme and sometimes frequent shifts in vertical restraints doctrine
make much more sense in terms of a series of confrontations between the
conflicting rhetorics of competition policy and common-law property
rights, especially in light of the internal tension visible in both rhetorics.
This internal tension has been driven by commitments to liberty and
equality. The shift from General Electric's deference to the property
rights of the manufacturer/consignor to Simpson's articulation of solici-
tude for independent service station owners can be understood as a shift
from property logic to its competition counterpart. It can also be under-
stood in terms of the liberty-equality tension within either logic. For
example, Simpson's competition logic makes reference to an overwhelm-
ing inequality of size and bargaining power between the Union Oil Com-
pany and Mr. Simpson. That inequality was seen as allowing Union to
coerce dealers who were not at liberty to set their own prices. Given an
oligopoly structure at the manufacturer level, the Court saw no likeli-
hood of competition without restoring the dealer's liberty to set a price.
The problem, of course, was that the manufacturer's liberty fell victim to
the Court's resolution of the conflict. Nonetheless, the Court was more
concerned with protecting the liberty of the class of independent entre-
preneurs-a sentiment heard since the Sherman Act's legislative history
and the Court's "literalist" period.
Third, this study' of the "free rider" rationale-associated in recent
vertical restraints cases with the new economics of distributional effi-
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ciency-introduces an analytical structure for understanding how the
tension between competition policy and common-law property rights has
produced the efficiency norm in its various forms. An understanding of
the complex relationship between competition policy and the efficiency
norm requires a recognition of the logic of common-law property rights,
as well as commitments to liberty and equality.
Within the context of vertical restraints doctrine, the volatile rela-
tionship between distributional efficiency and competition policy suggests
that courts should require manufacturers to carry a burden of proving
that, under the rule of reason, a nonprice restraint of intrabrand competi-
tion is a less restrictive alternative than pay-as-you-promote provisions
suggested by Professor Pitofsky and others. Moreover, courts should ex-
amine the market position of manufacturers, perhaps in terms of market
power, in judging the reasonableness of nonprice restraints. Such re-
straints should not be permitted as of right. Rather, in sharp contrast to
the Court's recent opinion in Sharp Electronics, a manufacturer should
be required to show a compelling competitive need for a restrictive prac-
tice. Precedent for such scrutiny can be found in the failing company
and nascent industry defenses already recognized in merger cases.
289
This inquiry would be part of the manufacturer's claim that it must disci-
pline free riders in order to enhance its competitive position.
Finally, the distinction between price and nonprice restraints should
be retained, despite all of its problems, because it creates the analytical
ground for adjudicating the conflict between the needs of manufacturers
and the need for a class of independent entrepreneurs. Modern antitrust
doctrine should not abandon this tradition of special solicitude for indus-
trial liberty, for the independent entrepreneur's freedom to compete. The
alternative disserves not only entrepreneurs but also consumers, because
the increasing concentration of ownership of the means of producing and
distributing goods and services in the late twentieth century is deeply
troubling, not only in economic terms of competition policy and property
rights, but also in socio-political terms of traditional commitments to lib-
erty and equality.
289. Justice Powell seemed to recognize this possibility in GTE Sylvania. See 433 U.S. at
53 n.22; supra note 254 and accompanying text.
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